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ABSTRACT
The Failure of Altruism:
Alternatives to Improve 
the Donor Rate in 
Organ Transplantation
by
John Richards Mundy
Dr. Craig Walton. Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Philosophy 
University of Nevada. Las Vegas
Ethical and moral issues facing potential organ donors, their families or agents, and 
the medical community are created and driven by the rapidly expanding demand for the 
life-giving resource (ever more successfully utilized) -  a factor coupled with the 
persistently scarce and relatively constant low level of supply. The serious nature of the 
shortage of compatible organs has prompted medical, ethical, and legal scholars to 
consider alternatives to altruistic donation. This approach has never been able to keep up 
with the demand -  indeed, it falls further behind each year. One set of alternatives 
involves (currently banned) financial incentives for organ donors I will argue that some 
form of incentive, or other policy-type recommendation is the only possible method of 
catching up with the technological innovations, that while incredible, serve to exacerbate 
the demand/supply dis-equilibrium. The thesis will examine the ethical and moral issues 
that pertain to this dilemma and recommend policies targeted at alternatives for resolving 
the supply problems.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Medicine and surgery in the late twentieth century are filled with ethical and 
policy dilemmas: the field of organ transplantation is no exception. Economic scarcity of 
donor organs for transplant is a large contributor to this dilemma. Many questions 
inevitably involve the underlying ethical principles of respecting the self determination of 
patients with decision making capacity {autonomy), acting to protect the patients' well­
being {societal intervention or qualitative benefit), and acting in a manner that promotes 
fairness and equity to all involved {justice). I will examine ethically defensible 
alternatives to altruistic donation and/or procurement of these scarce resources -  
specifically recommending alternatives to failed altruistic methods.
I will begin by detailing the extent of the problem. According to the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the number of organ transplants performed 
throughout the United States in 1997 (1998 data is not yet fully available) remained 
virtually unchanged from the 1996 total (See Appendix A - Table 1). While transplants 
from living donors increased approximately 5%, transplants from cadaveric (non-living) 
donors stayed nearly the same. “While we were able to save and enhance thousands of 
lives through transplantation last year, we are disappointed that we could not do more,” 
said UNOS president James F. Burdick, M.D., “Tens of thousands o f people continue to 
await a transplant, and about ten die each day because an organ was not available for
I
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them. The single greatest challenge we face in increasing organ transplantation is getting 
more personal commitments to organ donation.”* While Dr. Burdick made his statement 
in 1997. the issues are exactly the same in 1999.
A total o f 20.935 transplants were recorded in 1997, as opposed to 20.499 in 
1996. (See .Appendix A -  Table 1) There were 5,478 people who donated one or more 
organs upon death in 1997, an increase of about 1% over the 1996 total. Counting living 
donors there was a total of 9,298 human donors who contributed one or more organs 
during 1997. (See Appendix A - Table 2) Although the registration list varies 
throughout any given year, there were 65,733 people waiting as early March 1999. an 
increase of approximately 16% over the end of the year 1997. (See .Appendix A - Table 
3) Of those waiting on the list in 1997, a total of 4,855 died prior to getting a transplant, 
an increase of 12.6% over the prior year. (See Appendix A - Table 4) Organ transplants 
are being performed in the United States at a rate of growth such that the extent of the 
scarcity of donor organs for transplantation is so great that it would take almost the 
combined total o f transplants performed in the last three years to meet the need of 
patients now waiting. Despite the obvious need, the supply of donor organs has remained 
fairly constant notwithstanding national and local efforts to increase donations.
Major breakthroughs in scientific, technical, and medical areas of transplantation 
are responsible for the advances of the past three decades. Improvements in the surgical 
techniques of transplantation, the ability to preserve organs outside the body for brief 
periods of time, the capacity for maintaining bodily functions on artificial life support 
technologies, the ability to determine antibody and blood types from small tissue 
samples, the growing confidence with which physicians can diagnose brain death and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
emergence of powerful immuno-suppressive drugs -  especially cyclosporine -  have been 
responsible for the rapid expansion in both the number and kind of transplants that are 
now being performed.
The ability of transplantation teams at many medical centers in the United States, 
and around the world, to succeed in extending life beyond the onset of organ failure has 
commanded a great deal of attention from those outside the field of transplantation. 
Difficult questions persist concerning the need to advance further the art of 
transplantation, e.g. the importance of providing equitable access to existing transplant 
centers, the criteria that ought to be used in determining who should receive transplants 
as well as a number of other issues have occupied a prominent and growing place in both 
legislatures and the media. Perhaps the most pressing policy issue facing both those 
within and outside of the field concerns the shortage of organs available for 
transplantation to those with end stage organ failure. A great deal of debate, discussion, 
legislation, and regulation among many different elements within U.S. society has been 
directed at the question o f how to increase the supply of organs for transplantation. 
Because the number of organs available is presently determined largely by the number of 
cadaver donors, and because the need for organs has grown and continues to grow at an 
exponential pace with thousands wanting a kidney, heart, liver, etc. It has become 
apparent that moral, ethical and policy issues related to organ procurement are extremely 
visible among the many issues raised by organ transplantation today.
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Historical Perspectives
The earliest days of transplantation involving human subjects were characterized 
by the inability o f transplant surgeons to overcome the problems of organ rejection. 
Many approaches to the problem were tried, including various drugs and even massive 
exposure to total body irradiation, but none proved effective. Many physicians, knowing 
that little could be done about rejection, felt that it was morally objectionable to offer 
kidney transplants to patients.^ Others within and outside medicine worried about the 
advisability of developing transplantation as the intervention of choice for kidney failure. 
Some favored putting social resources in to the development of artificial kidneys. Still 
others argued for prevention or for the use of public monies for other purposes (dialysis) 
for which established therapies already existed.^ Although these concepts were discussed 
and written about twenty and thirty years ago, the issues are still with us today.
During this early period, U.S. courts indicated that it was permissible for a 
competent adult to decide to give a kidney to a family member. The possibility of 
providing a life saving “gift” to a family member seemed to outweigh the risks to 
personal health that were involved in the donation of a kidney. In a landmark case. 
Stnink V. Stnmk, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in favor of a brother with kidney 
failure in a case brought by the state on behalf of his mentally incompetent younger 
brother. This allowed a transplant which saved the sick brother’s life and did not harm 
the donor. This case has been cited with great frequency in nearly all fifty states, and 
indeed appears to meet all the legitimacy tests: rules, justification, and consent."* Also, 
during this era, surgeons were almost entirely dependent upon live donations in order to 
attempt kidney transplants. One of the major concerns of courts and government was to
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assure that the interests and welfare of prospective donors were adequately considered by 
those involved in or seeking transplants. Even though the chances of the operation's 
succeeding were small, during this period, the courts were of the view that a decision to 
help a family member ought to be respected as long as that decision was based upon an 
informed, voluntary choice on the part of the donor.
Courts of this era (the late 1960s through the late 1970s), were particularly 
concerned about the voluntary nature of decisions to donate. This was a result o f three 
factors. First, there were serious if small risks associated with the surgery to remove a 
kidney. Second, in some cases children or adults afflicted with certain physical or mental 
impairments that might adversely limit their decision-making capacities were asked to 
consider donation. Third, those making donations seemed particularly vulnerable to 
coercion in that the people who needed the organs were biological relatives. In another 
landmark case, McFall v. Shitnp, the legitimacy of autonomy and consent was upheld. In 
the summer of 1978, McFall developed a rare and terminal blood disease, which as it 
turned out would require a bone marrow transplant to save his life. An exhaustive search 
eliminated a large number of family members who had volunteered, yet to no avail. 
Finally near death, a distant cousin (Shimp) agreed to be tested. He was a perfect match. 
However, his wife objected and he in turn refused to go through with the painful but 
essentially low risk procedure. McFall’s family sued in the Pennsylvania courts, where 
in a series of remarkably fast decisions, appeals, reversals, more and more appeals, the 
State Court of Appeals finally ruled that Shimp could not be compelled to donate as it 
would be a violation of his rights of self determination and autonomy. McFall died three
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weeks after this ruling, prior to being heard in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Here the 
rules of law were clearly present and consent was absolutely upheld.'
Transplant Law Legitimacy
As stated earlier, tens of thousands of individuals are waiting for properly 
matched organs for transplantation. At the same time, thousands are dying while waiting. 
In such an environment, moral and ethical issues related to doing the right thing often are 
in pragmatic conflict with legislation and regulations. This is where the concept of legal 
legitimacy becomes crucial to the process. Are the laws and regulations actually 
legitimate when to a great measure (while beneficially coordinating screening and 
waiting lists), they mostly perpetuate the scarcity by prohibiting alternative proposals 
which could alleviate the shortages and thus the sufferings and certain death of those with 
end stage organ failure?
The concept of legitimacy, is based on three underlying precepts. First, 
legitimacy which (can) give authority to power, emanates from rules. Rules in a 
democracy can be verbal (unwritten) or formalized as laws, codes, statutes etc. 
Nevertheless, they tend to be precise and enforceable. When adhered to, society is 
respecting the power/authority vested in the rules. When authority is forced or acquired 
in contravention of the rules, that authority is illegitimate. Second, just having authority 
is insufficient for a law with possession o f power to be legitimate. Legitimacy requires 
common beliefs in the validity o f laws that are shared by both the dominant and the 
subordinate - as in those who enforce/uphold laws and those who obey them. Third, 
legitimacy requires an expressed consent of those who are subordinate to the laws or to
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those who hold power. Without consent, there can be no legitimacy. While some may 
argue that the three precepts may in some societies exist in different forms or may not be 
as “absolute” as stated briefly above, legitimacy would be eroded if laws were not 
absolutely so grounded.
Given the circumstances that have evolved in the field of transplantation, where 
the existing laws are mostly grounded in altruistic morality, the question must be asked -  
are transplant laws really legitimate or are they lacking one or more of the precepts of 
legitimacy? It is not surprising, therefore, that the legal system during this era based 
solid organ donation on the individual’s autonomous choice. The courts believed and 
insisted that the welfare of those confronted with the option of donating a kidney could 
best be protected by demanding that decisions be made in an informed, uncoerced 
manner by those competent to do so. Autonomy and volunteerism became the ethical 
and moral linchpins of organ procurement and have remained so.
Legislative and Regulatory Background
Legal systems are different among countries. Some have systems based on judge- 
made law, reflecting a region’s customs and prioritization of values. This may be 
supplemented, consolidated or amended by politically-inspired legislation. Those 
conditions exist in the United States today. Often those systems are described as 
common law systems. In contrast, others have defined all prevailing rights and duties in 
a single code, legislated at the highest level of authority, so that a presumed right or duty 
must be derived from language in the code. Judges interpret what the code means, but 
are not themselves an original source of the law. These systems are often described as
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8civil law systems. Further, systems of religious law also apply in many countries. These 
are based on authoritative interpretations of sacred texts. In religious law systems, sacred 
texts are usually interpreted to prevail over other expressions of law in case of conflict.
Not every country has legislation specifically addressing the taking of organs or 
tissues from living persons, from persons after death, or from either. Issues at death, 
respect for and disposal o f dead bodies, and preservation of the integrity of the bodies of 
the living are, however, almost invariably of spiritual and religious concern.
Few if any countries have legislation that deals exhaustively or comprehensively 
with organ or tissue acquisition from bodies of living or deceased persons and 
transplantation into bodies of recipients. Although almost every country has laws 
regarding organ transplantation, they are not normally exhaustive or comprehensive. 
Indeed, the legislation in itself will not usually tell medical, ethical, and legal 
practitioners all that they need to know about the legal environment in which 
practitioners are acting or about to act. Usually, practitioners within the field of 
transplantation find little more than generalized direction, and those individuals have to 
find answers to deep questions not so much from the specific language of the law, but 
often by previous interpretation and/or precedents.
In the United States, issues related to laws about transplantation have evolved into 
a formalized context only within the last thirty years. Legal issues relating to 
transplantation had been incorporated into several annotated forms of policy, all o f which 
are a subset to the broader national health policy concerns. Many of these specific issues 
will be developed and expanded upon in a following chapter. The development of organ 
transplantation policy has been driven by a philosophical or ideological perspective that
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is grounded in autonomy and fundamentally different from the utilitarian perspective that 
has driven other facets of health policy in the last two decades.
But at the most basic level, organ transplantation policy deals with the problem of 
coping with the costs o f catastrophic disease. For years, there has been a debate in health 
policy circles about the best way to conceptualize the very special problems posed by 
catastrophic disease.^ Should the nature and effect of an illness — e.g., whether it is life 
threatening — guide our thinking? Or should the financial consequences of an illness -  
whether it be an acute life threatening episode, or a long-term chronic problem be 
determinate?
Although far from comprehensive. Congress did enact the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988 which reflects adherence to the financial consequences definition. 
More on this subject will also be covered in a subsequent chapter.
Transplantation law, like most others in the United States, has grown 
incrementally. However, unlike many laws, the rapid advances in medical and 
pharmacological technology have forced many incremental adjustments to the thirty year 
old body of transplantation law. In the U.S., transplant law has grown by analogy, that is, 
by accommodating to new questions by using concepts already articulated and accepted 
as law, for example, “object o f personal property.” The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(UAGA), first codified in 1968, originated as an analogous compilation of judicial 
decisions, statutes, customs, or practices developed in all fifty states. In the U.S., many 
“uniform” ideas and/or laws are a compilation of state customs, that are consolidated at 
some point into a “uniform” context. Once consolidate, they are sent to the states for 
ratification; a process that could take years. It is analogous to the constitutional
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10
amendment process. In 1968 UAGA (which was not ratified by all 50 states until 1973), 
had a harmonizing effect among the competing interests, who in the first decade of 
transplantation had often come up against the pure legality of transplantation. The 
UAGA established that the body and its parts were property. The owner of that property, 
therefore, had the right to make a gift of any or all of those parts. Previously there had 
been a number of competing interests regarding the physical disposition o f the potential 
donor’s body, as well as with any legal questions which covered a large range of property 
and personal rights.
The principal competing interests regarding the physical disposition are;
1. The wishes of the deceased during his lifetime concerning the disposition of his 
body.
2. The desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin.
3. The interests of the state in determining by autopsy, the cause of death in cases 
involving crime or violence.
4. The need of autopsy to determine the cause of death when private legal rights are 
dependent on such cause.
5. The need of society for bodies, tissues and organs for medical education, research, 
therapy and transplantation.
Prior to UAGA, the principal legal questions were;
1. W’ho may during his lifetime make a legally effective gift of his body or a part 
thereof?
2. What is the right o f the next of kin, either to set aside the decedent’s expressed 
wishes, for themselves to make the anatomical gifts from the dead body?
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3. Who may legally become donors of anatomical gifts?
4. For what purposes may such gifts be made?
5. How may gifts be made, can it be done by will, by writing, by a card carried on 
the person, or by telegraphic or recorded telephonic communication?
UAGA in harmonizing the competing interests and answering the legal questions, 
stated that donation was a legal gift. It was the voluntary act of an individual in writing, 
before two witnesses, giving some or all of one’s body at death for transplantation, 
therapy, education, or research. Delivery of the document of gift was not required, nor 
was it necessary to name a donee.
Other sections o f the 1968 UAGA specified the manner of making the gift, 
amending or revoking the gift, the rights and duties at death, and the immunity from civil 
or criminal liability o f persons who acted in good faith in accord with the provisions of 
the act. The medical profession soon considered the UAGA the Holy Grail of organ 
procurement.
The UAGA is still on the books. For its time, it served to alleviate medical,
ethical, and legal problems that had arisen during the first decade of organ
transplantation. In the late 1960s, issues over contraception, abortion, sterilization, health 
care allocation/availability, and transplantation were just beginning to surface. Now 
priorities and viewpoints have changed, such that advances in technology issues and 
greater legal recognition of patient autonomy are frequently aired in the press and even 
on television. It is useful to look at UAGA in terms o f Congressional intent and content. 
The intent of Congress was to deal legally with several problems that piece-meal 
legislation enacted by the states did not solve. For example, an individual who executes a
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donor statement in one state, then moves to another, and dies in a state with different 
laws; the rights of surviving spouses and/or family in the absence of the donor's explicit 
instructions; the absence of clear orders of priority among survivors to carry out the 
decedent’s expressed intention; and the protection of physicians from civil or criminal 
liability for organ removal. These and a host of other thorny issues had sprung up during 
the 1960s since the first successful transplants. Most of the state legislatures had created 
such a hodgepodge of often conflicting laws, that many of the participants did not know 
what the controlling authority really was. Hence, judicial law-making in the field of 
transplantation had developed throughout the 1960s. Unfortunately, while gathering all 
of their then-known categories of problems in one bundle. Congress to a large extent left 
cohesive enforcement vague and ambiguous. Therefore, we now have some rules that 
for the first time were formalized; however, xhe. justification problem remained, for most 
of the states had laws that were almost universally grounded in altruistic mores in which 
not all participants had a common or even majority belief. Thus validity and acceptance 
of authority became an immediate and continuing issue. Without common beliefs in the 
justification process, for most practical purposes, judicial law-making continued.
Consent occurred because Americans by and large accept judicial rulings at least when 
the Supreme Court finally rules. Aggregating over the passage of time, UAGA is not 
truly legitimate.
UAGA was not a failure, it just did not live up to the 1968 intent - on the other 
hand, how could it? Near the end of the 1970s decade, medical and surgical technology 
began rocketing forward, forcing reconsideration of many if not most of the altruistic 
ethics that had guided and constrained the development of transplantation law so far.
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UAGA did establish several regulations/procedures that survive today, including two 
concepts relating to death. Only the patient’s attending physician can determine and 
pronounce death and that physician cannot be part of the harvesting or transplantation 
team, thus avoiding conflicts of interest. Further, other physicians also are prohibited 
from participating on both harvesting and transplantation teams, thus avoiding conflicts 
of interest. While still in effect, the definition of death has undergone transformation -  it 
is no longer cessation of heartbeat and respiration (as in 1968), but the determination of 
“brain death” that is now accepted. Brain death includes the cessation of heartbeat and 
respiration, but also further includes the cessation of all functions o f the total brain -  no 
valid electro-encephalographic impulses.
The late 1970s and early '80s saw a medical/pharmacological breakthrough that 
changed the science, the ethics, and the law in one astounding development -  the 
implementation of the miracle drug cyclosporine. Cyclosporine had and continues to 
have the ability to fight off rejection. This meant, quite simply, that transplantation was 
not tied to related living donors, in that for the first time well-matched cadavers could be 
used with a greatly increased probability of success. Throughout the 1980s, demand for 
transplantation begin to grow exponentially. Matching the supply o f organs with the 
demand had always yielded a shortage. However, now (by the mid 1980s) hearts, lungs, 
livers, the stomach, and pancreas were either being experimented upon or were (in the 
case of livers) becoming fairly commonplace. With cyclosporine indeed becoming a 
miracle drug, and saving thousands of lives by the mid-eighties, new ethical and legal 
problems began to arise.
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In 1984 the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was enacted establishing 
rules for obtaining organs. Although not addressing resource allocation problems, NOTA 
did establish legitimacy on the donor’s side of the equation. It created rules that specified 
how and in which circumstances organs could be legally secured from living and cadaver 
donors. It made illegal some forms o f procurement, such as sales or other types of 
financial compensation. It created more of a level playing field (although not perfectly 
level) it has not proved to be terribly efficient. But in the rising national optimism over 
the opportunities for living a restored healthy life, most people accepted NOT.A’s 
validity.
By 1984 we had formalized ntles that if not universally right, most transplant 
community participants felt that it represented most of their commonly held beliefs, so 
we also had justification. Finally, although the constraints keep the supply well under the 
ever increasing demand - mostly for ethical reasons, as patients who are desperate would 
likely pay for their organs - the general population reacting in outrage to that prospect has 
consented to the laws covering organ procurement.
Summarizing briefly, UAGA and NOTA still rule transplantation today (there 
have been periodic amendments). UAGA was not very efficient and not legitimate, while 
NOTA is not very efficient but was at least legitimate by the decade of the 1980s 
standards.
Hypothesis
The advent and implementation of the immuno-suppressive drug cyclosporine, in 
the late 70s/early 1980s, significantly changed the patterns of survivability of organs for
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transplant. With the earlier, near-absolute necessity of requiring a close relative to donate 
a kidney as a living donor, the newly available use of cadaveric organs opened the 
possibilities for transplants of a number of different solid organs. While cadaveric organs 
now represent approximately three of every four of the kidneys being transplanted today, 
for other solid organs (hearts, lungs, whole livers, pancreas, intestines, bone, etc.), 
cadaveric resources represent 100% of the scarce resources for transplant. A small 
portion of the number of liver transplants, for specific conditions, are carried out via the 
removal o f a small ‘iobe” section from the living donor. Nevertheless, nearly all non­
kidney transplants are sourced from cadaveric donors.
Given the current and potential future demand for cadaver organs, there may be 
no way to avoid the problem of rationing for most forms of transplantation. Therefore, it 
is both morally and ethically sensible to examine current public policies with respect to 
the procurement of organs for transplantation to determine whether legal or regulatory 
changes might be effected that would help maximize the supply of tissues/organs 
available to those in need.
Although many of those involved in organ procurement are making some efforts 
to increase the supply of organs from cadaveric donors, there are a number of factors that 
severely inhibit the ability of the present system to take advantage of the supply 
(potentially) available from cadavers. Both economic and legal obstacles impede the 
present system of voluntary donation. Further, there is a real probability that unless 
something is done to improve the efficacy/efficiency of the volunteer system, the free 
market responding to the overwhelming demand will present a potential solution which
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might include the possible establishment of a for-profit or financial incentive solution in 
order to meet the overwhelming scarcity dilemma.
There would appear to be a number of obstacles that work against the efficacy of 
the current volunteerism policy in obtaining cadaver organs. First, many people find that 
the subject of death and organ donation upsetting and distasteful. Although surveys show 
that the public is willing to support organ donation, it is difficult to transform willingness 
into concrete realization on a donor card or driver's license.^
Second, most physicians and nurses do not want to inquire about organ donation. 
The highly emotional circumstances under which such requests are made make it 
uncomfortable for both families and medical personnel to communicate about the subject 
of donation.
The research problem of this thesis is wrapped around several conflicting 
variables. The variables themselves -  medical, ethical and legal -  are complex in their 
own right, such that when stirred into the cauldron of a relatively young medical and 
scientific specialty, it is difficult to generate a formula that can solve the dilemma of the 
altruistic donor supply and still be acceptable to society. It is my hypothesis that a 
successful solution to the dilemma can be approached and implemented. In subsequent 
chapters, I will lay the groundwork concerning the economic, ethical, and policy issues 
that can combine to form a positive solution to the problem.
In the following chapters, I will lay the groundwork for analyzing how altruism 
has failed to motivate enough potential donors to provide organs to satisfy the desperate 
needs of those with end-stage organ failure. In Chapter Two, I will empirically examine 
the supply problem. The first place to look is how society views and deals with
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healthcare issues on a macroallocative basis. This requires an examination o f costs and 
benefits, as well as, factors pertaining to the expenditures of scarce societal resources at 
what are (in the field o f medicine) often diminishing returns. The economics of organ 
transplantation essentially deal with a priceless form o f scarcity -  organs are extremely 
limited in their availability and simultaneously the most perishable goods on the planet -  
there is no inventory. Chapter Two will discuss these issues and conclude with a listing 
and brief description of a number of practical “market” type solutions, as well as, a 
preview of several non-financial alternatives. A more detailed examination of 
alternatives, per se, will be conducted in Chapter Four.
In Chapter Three, I make the claim that the organ shortage failure is not so much 
the fault of altruism, but society’s failure to recognize the problem as a duty or obligation 
to assist their fellows when in need. Perhaps that comes close to altruism or volunteerism 
not working, however, the argument will be made via moral theory and practical 
examples that if we collectively recognized our obligations, the organ supply problem 
would not be a practical one. Chapter Three also critically assesses the minority donation 
issues in American society. Minorities, who typically represent a large proportion of 
those needing transplants, just as typically, refuse or are reluctant to donate. This chapter 
examines the moral, cultural, psychological, religious, and racial factors that contribute to 
their under-participation as donors.
Chapter Four goes straight to the point of incentives (financial and non-financial), 
offering market-type solutions to the donor supply problem. Incentives have been looked 
at and considered previously, but, they are currently not permitted in the U.S. Any 
ultimate adoption o f  an incentive would have to surmount a high ethical and legal
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threshold prior to any implementation. I will examine several proposals that have been 
discussed in the literature and offer current reasons for their reasonableness and ethical 
validity. Some will fall short of the threshold. I will also offer a compromise plan that 
could meet pragmatic as well as ethical criteria.
In Chapter Five, I summarize the analysis undertaken in the previous sections, and 
specify why, I think certain of my intermediate conclusions will work, if given a chance.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SUPPLY PROBLEM
Health Care Scarcity
There appears to be a fairly broad consensus among health economists that in 
most instances, Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand o f the market works very badly to allocate 
resources for health care. Health economics, faced with market failure, appears to be 
only involved as a sub-field of research and study, aimed at creating public policy tools 
which can achieve some form of optimum distribution of the scarce resource of health 
care.
The concept of scarcity tells us that in general there will never be enough 
resources to provide every health-related service to every person who might want or need 
that service. Having MRI machines on every comer available for anyone who needed 
that service might be desirable and occasionally even handy, but at this extreme no 
society could afford a health care system where resources were essentially un-rationed.
Many citizens would argue that at a given level of investment in health care, other 
needs (housing, education, leisure, consumption o f other goods, etc.) have an equal or 
greater priority. Therefore, it is not really a great surprise that when weighing the cost 
and benefits of health interventions, citizens, providers and others in the medical sector
20
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may come to the conclusion that a particular marginal benefit is not worth the cost -  
which, of course, is also a value judgement with ethical impacts. By providing 
information about the relative cost of achieving health benefits (an organ transplant 
versus years o f expensive and invasive dialysis treatments), health economics is able to 
provide data and focused analysis, but ultimately the decision that one intervention is 
valuable and another is not, cannot be made solely on economic grounds.
For several reasons it is difficult to be precise about transplant health care costs. 
First, an individual patient’s medical course is complicated and unpredictable; it depends 
on the patient’s initial condition, and the skill of the transplant team and support staff. 
Second, reported cost figures are generally incomplete. Often they include surgeon’s 
fees, organ procurement cost, capital cost, and the cost o f screening patients not accepted 
as candidates. These costs may be omitted because they are not available or more 
typically because the focus o f those compiling them is only on the budget of a particular 
institution or program (e.g., the transplant center or Medicare), as opposed to complete 
medical care costs. Finally, the figures that are available, especially those for hospital 
care, generally reflect arbitrary accounting standards rather than true economic costs. 
Nevertheless, given the emergence of economics as the policy science over the past 
several decades, health economists are under considerable pressure to create technical 
tools, which disguise political responsibility, and thus evade the ethical responsibility for 
health care rationing. This occurs when empirical analyses are used to obfuscate political 
and ethical responsibility.
Complicating health economists’ approach to real policy problems is the ethical 
principle underlining health economics — utilitarianism. Utilitarians assume that health
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care systems exist to maximize total health output, that is, to provide the greatest health 
for the greatest number of people. For the individual, however, utility can be defined as a 
function of one’s preferences for health state satisfaction, well-being, and/or life 
expectancy.
To evaluate health-related quality of life, one must consider all of the different 
ways that illness and its treatment affect outcomes. Health concerns can be reduced to 
two categories: life duration and quality of life. Individuals are concerned about illness, 
disability, and effects of treatment because they can affect life expectancy and quality of 
life. The assessment o f a particular transplant candidate should consider the following 
basic questions. Does the illness or its treatment make life last a shorter duration of time? 
Does the condition or its treatment make life less desirable and if so, how much less 
desirable? What are the duration effects: how much life is lost or how long is the period 
of undesirable health effects? Determining how illness or treatment affects desirability of 
life is a matter o f preference or utility. Such evaluations require that health states be 
compared to one another.
The balance of Chapter Two looks at how health economics considers health care 
generally and organ transplants in greater specific detail. Economics as a policy science 
addressing health care issues, takes more of a positive empirical viewpoint than a 
normative subjective approach. That said. Chapter Two will deal more in the arena o f a 
cost/benefit analysis approach from the macro or top-down viewpoint. That is, when 
economics studies healthcare issues, it is examining the global perspective of diseases, 
cures, research and development, and budgets etc. Accordingly, in Chapter Two I’ve 
discussed costs/benefit approaches as well as a unique measurement device created
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especially for health economics. That is the concept of QALYs, a measurement protocol 
for converting total resources expended with the number o f qualitative life years per 
dollar of expenditure.
In the second part of Chapter Two, I’ll examine a number of alternative proposals 
to the current altruistic volunteer system for donating organs. Several will be introduced, 
and a few incentive alternatives will be graduated on to Chapter Four, for a more intense 
analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of an empirical reality 
check with absolutely practical applications, and compare it to the more normative 
discussion which follows in Chapter Three and deals with ethical and moral questions 
regarding donation.
Monetary Evaluation of Length and Quality of Life
The idea of assigning to human life a value measured in monetary units may meet 
with widespread disapproval. The objections raised are two different kinds. A principal 
attitude is that any attempt in trying to compare life and money is morally reprehensible. 
On a more pragmatic level, such a comparison would be accepted, but any other result 
than that of an infinite value of life would be called into question.
The weighing o f life and freedom from bodily harm on one side and money on the 
other is considered profane by moral rigorists, whether inspired by Christian belief, the 
oath of Hippocrates, or a humanistic philosophy of life. Some would say that economic 
approaches to these evaluations are put on a par with the euthanasia programs of the 
Third Reich. Does such a valuation not imply that it is acceptable to kill those whose 
“value” does not cover the cost of living, such as food and medical treatment?
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First, this argument fails to take into consideration the “morally relevant 
difference” between actively intervening and letting nature run its course, that is. between 
the act of killing incurables and making do without life-support devices. This distinction 
plays a major role in the discussion on “dying and dignity.” Of course it can be said that 
refusing to give a person essential food for free is morally equivalent to killing that 
person, however, the greater the efforts required to save a human life, the less valid this 
argument is. For example, assume that rescuing a group of miners buried in a pit would 
cost thousands of billions of dollars, causing the rest of the country to survive in misery. 
Can a refusal to rescue the miners then be treated as equivalent to killing them?
Second, we have to keep in mind that most public decisions do not affect 
“identified” but “statistical lives.” If life-threatening dangers of personally identified 
individuals are involved, politicians usually are expected to do everything possible to 
save the lives of the victims, probably because the public is aware that even a maximum 
effort would only consume a very small percentage of the Gross Domestic Product. For 
example, assume it would take ten million dollars for saving each miner buried in the pit. 
This does not imply that the public would consent to the government spending the same 
amount on averting a risk of being buried of one in a thousand, for one thousand miners. 
“Statistical” lives tend to cause less emotion than “identified” lives.
Realizing that the issue is not so much weighing life against money, but rather 
length of the life span against money could help to de-emotionalize the subject. When 
thinking of medical treatment or public security measures, we usually think of lives 
actually saved. In reality, however, life is prolonged only (often) with some heroic 
performances of high-tech medicine resulting in a gain of a few months, for in the long
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run everybody has to die. So actually the measurement of an extended life span against a 
better quality of life is most germane, since more money purchased resources means 
permitting a higher quality o f life. Therefore, the moral argument of an inadmissible 
valuation of life in terms of money is not as convincing as it appears at first sight. ‘
However, the main justification for elaborating and applying an economic 
approach is based on the simple observation that political decisions involving such 
valuations have to be made regularly. The mere fact that some action is undertaken (or 
refrained from) implicitly means that a weighing of prolonged statistical lives against 
money has occurred. The economic calculus facilitates awareness of this fact, helping to 
make policies more consistent.
Conversely, doing without an economic valuation of “life” entails risks of its own. 
A country may introduce a measure (such as introducing new medical technology) 
resulting in costs of one million dollars for avoiding premature deaths, yet fail to take into 
account alternative measures (for example public road works) that could do the same for 
only fifty thousand dollars. Society as a whole will be deprived of a longer life 
expectation.
For decades now, parliaments and legislatures in many countries have usually 
approved public projects only after a thorough evaluation of all o f their costs and 
benefits. But when it comes to human lives, there has been a lack o f approved procedure 
to evaluate them in monetary units. As a substitute, it has become customary to mention 
such costs and benefits known as “intangibles,” without, however, considering them as 
net benefits in the actual evaluation process. Consequently, projects such as 
transplantation with high risk factors in terms of human lives are easily approved, while
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those with a lower risk tend to be rejected. Ironically, those who are against a valuation 
of life in monetary units thus obtain the exact opposite o f what they intend.
Public policies in a democracy should not only be consistent in the above- 
mentioned sense, but also capable of reflecting the preferences o f the citizens involved. 
Since permitting affected citizens to express their preferences is a prerequisite of 
democracy, the moral condemnation of weighing money against life is at odds with the 
democratic principle. By determining the preferences o f citizens regarding life span and 
quality of life, economic analysis thus also serves to enhance the process of democratic 
decision making. These considerations make clear that expressing the value of human 
life in monetary terms is not the same as estimating its market or financial value. Rather 
it amounts to describing the preferences of the individual concerned or of society at large 
among mutually exclusive alternatives.
The QALY Concept
Within the past few years interest has been growing in using quality of life data to 
help evaluate the benefits of health care programs. In cost-effective analysis, the benefits 
of medical care can be expressed in terms of “well years.” Many have chosen to describe 
outcomes in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). The term “QALY” has become 
generalized and is now in widespread use. QALYs integrate the value of quality-of-life 
with a value of length of life into a single index number, which may then be used as a 
currency in which the benefits of health care interventions can be expressed. In the 
simplest case, in which a person remains in the same health state for a number of years, 
QALYs (assuming no discounting) are calculated according to the following formula;
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QALY=H X Y
Where H is the relative weight attached to a particular health state and Y is the number of 
years spent in that health state? Although QALYs can be used to measure the benefit 
derived from different therapies by an individual patient, for the purposes of the goals of 
this paper, they are discussed in the context of their use in the allocation of scarce health 
resources among different potential transplant patients.
Nord (1994) suggests that although the number o f QALYs gained from different 
interventions only represent the (unweighted) sum of gains and individual utility, they 
have been used to represent social value, whereby they are seen as a measure of society’s 
preferences over different health care outcomes.^ Nord also cites a paper by Weinstein 
and Stason (1977) as evidence that such evaluations have been used in this wider sense; 
“alternative programs for services are then ranked from the lowest value to the highest, 
and selected from the top until available resources are exhausted” (Nord, et. al., 1993).'* 
According to Weinstein and Stason, this ranking of alternatives takes place 
according to the aggregate unweighted number of QALYs obtained, i.e., those that yield 
more QALYs are ranked higher than those that yield fewer. This defines the objectives 
of the health care system in terms of the maximization of health gain, and is consistent 
with defining need in terms of capacity to benefit. In other words, an allocation of 
resources that maximizes the number of QALYs gained is defined as an efficient one. Of 
course, it is possible that people would want decision-makers when choosing between 
alternatives, and be also concerned with how those QALYs are distributed, and again 
different definitions o f and approaches toward the need are relevant. For example, if 
need is defined in terms of ill health -  those in the worst health states are those most in
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need of treatment -  then pretreatment health status becomes the most important 
consideration in determining priorities. Alternatively, if need is defined in terms of final 
health status, then post-treatment status is more important.
Despite the differences in approach, some important assumptions are similar. All 
approaches set one completely healthy year of life at an index o f 1. Years of life at less 
than optimal health are scored at less than I . The basic assumption is that 2 years scored 
as 0.5 add up to the equivalent of 1 year of complete wellness. Similarly, 4 years scored 
as 0.25 are equivalent to 1 completely well year o f life. A treatment that boosts a 
patient’s health from 0.5 to 0.75 produces the equivalent of 0.25 QALYs. If applied to 
four individuals and the duration of the treatment effect is one year, the effect of the 
treatment would be equivalent to one completely well year of life. Economists disagree 
not over the QALY concept, but rather over how the weights for cases between 0 and 1 
are obtained.
Different techniques have been used to assess utilities for health states. Some 
analysts do not measure utilities directly. Instead, they evaluate health outcome by 
simply assigning a reasonable utility.^ However, most current approaches have 
respondents assign weights to different health states on a scale ranging from 0 (for dead) 
to 1 (for wellness). The most common techniques include category rating scales, 
magnitude estimations, the standard gamble, the time trade-off, and the person trade-off.
• Rating Scales -  rating scales provide simple techniques for assigning numerical 
values to objects. The category scale is a method in which subjects are requested to 
assign a number to each case selected from a set of numbered categories representing 
equal intervals. This method, exemplified by the familiar ten-point rating scale, is
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efficient, easy to use, and applicable in a large number o f situations. Typically, the 
subject reads the description of a particular case, and rates it on a scale ranging from 
0 for dead to 10 for an optimum health state function.
Magnitude Estimation — a specific case is selected as a standard and assigned a 
particular number. Then other cases are rated in relation to the standard. For 
example, if the standard is assigned the number 10, a case regarded as half as 
desirable as the standard, is given the number 5. If it is regarded as twice as 
desirable, it is given the number 20. Ratings are then aggregated using a geometric 
mean.
The Standard Gamble — a method which explicitly considers decisions and choices 
made under uncertainty. The standard gamble offers the choice between two 
alternatives; living in health state A with certainty or taking a gamble on treatment for 
which the outcome is uncertain. The respondent is told that treatment will lead to 
perfect health with the probability o ïp  or immediate death with the probability of \-p 
(the choice health state B). The health state described in A is intermediate between 
wellness and death (analogous to end stage kidney failure with certain treatment 
available via dialysis). The probability ip) is varied until the subject is indifferent 
between choices A and B. An attractive feature (for economists) o f the standard 
gamble is that it is based on axioms of microeconomic utility theory.
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Standard Gamble
Choice A — no gamble Remain in state A
Dialysis -  no transplant
Prob. = p
Choice B — gamble
Prob. = 1 —
Cure — go to wellness 
Risk transplant
Death
Time Trade-off — an alternative to the standard gamble yet consistent with the 
concepts of opportunity and choices, uses a trade-off in time. Here, the subject is 
offered a choice of living for a defined amount of time in perfect health or a variable 
amount of time in an alternative state that is less desirable. Presumably, all subjects 
would choose a year of wellness versus a year with some health problems. However, 
by reducing the time of wellness and leaving the time in the sub-optimal health state 
fixed (such as one year), an indifference time can be determined. For example, a 
patient may rate living in a wheel chair for two years as equivalent to perfect wellness 
for one year. The Time Trade-off (TTO) is theoretically appealing because it asks 
subjects to explicitly state their preferences in terms o f quality life year equivalence. 
Person Trade-off -  allows comparisons of the numbers of people helped in different 
health states. Patients might be asked how many persons in state B must be helped to 
provide a benefit equivalent to helping one person in health state A. From a policy 
perspective, the Person Trade-off (PTO) directly seeks information similar to that 
required as a basis for policy decisions.
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Several articles reviewed by Nord (1993), have compared utilities or health states as 
captured by different methods.^ Most health care economists examining the above 
methods, have proposed the standard gamble or time trade-off methods as having more 
validity criteria than various rating scale methods or the magnitude estimation formats. 
However, Nord suggests that we move away from methods based on the assessment of 
individual utility, such as the Standard Gamble (SG) or the Time Trade-off (TTO), 
towards methods based on the assessment o f social preferences, such as the Person 
Trade-off (PTO). Using this approach. Nord posits that respondents indicate the number 
of people in one health state, as mentioned above, which they would need to be able to 
treat (with a specified outcome) to make them indifferent to treating a given number in 
another health state (again with a specified outcome). Valuations from this technique can 
be seen as representing the trade-offs that people are prepared to make between gains in 
(length and) quality of life, and number of persons treated.
There are some problems with Nord’s proposal. Responses to PTO questions 
contain relative weights a respondent attaches to at least four subsets; (1) the severity of 
the pre-intervention health state; (2) the severity of the post-intervention health state; (3) 
the health gain as a result of intervening; and (4) the number of persons treated. It would 
be impossible from answers to PTO questions to determine/distinguish what are the 
relative weights attached to each of these considerations. While all four are likely to be 
important, different weights attached to each may have quite different implications for 
resource allocation decisions.
Paul Dolan (1997) has suggested an alternative approach. Using a particular class 
of health-related social welfare functions (HRSWF),^ he allows efficiency and equity to
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be considered independently. Dolan’s central theme is that it is possible to characterize 
social welfare by a vector o f individual welfares. Economists have typically argued that 
individuals are the best judges of their own well-being and that social welfare depends 
only on the welfare of persons in society. For Dolan, it was necessary to assume that it is 
possible to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. For example, while it is known 
that different HRSWFs have different types or comparability, maximizing the sum of 
individual utilities requires that the differences in utilities can be compared.
The application o f a utilitarian HRSWF to health care implies that HRSW is 
maximized when the total number of QALYs gained (subject to a budget constraint) is 
maximized. But the utilitarian approach is only one approach to deriving a HRSWF from 
individual utilities. Another might be to adopt a decision rule that gives greater weight to 
one individual’s utility than to another’s. For example, a "'maximin” approach would 
require giving greatest weight to the treatment of the more seriously ill individual (as 
often happens in transplantation ethics).
Notwithstanding the concepts and issues brought to health care economics 
generally and transplant economics specifically, utility and social welfare are not the only 
analysis method components that measure efficiency and the effectiveness of health 
alternatives. When considering a comparison of costs and benefits in an overview of 
health economics, the use o f marginal benefit analysis for health policy could be useful. 
By this analysis is meant the way in which economics conceptualizes questions of 
relative cost and benefits for different health interventions. In particular, it is the use of 
average marginal benefit in health policy, which has ethical dimensions not often 
considered when policy prescriptions for (e.g.) “outcome based funding” are advanced.
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Marginal social value of health care
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Marginal benefit, on the graph above, with quality adjusted life years (QALYS) -  
one of the tools designed to capture both quantity and quality gains in a single measure — 
on the vertical axis and total resource dollars available on the horizontal, can be applied 
to a number of different levels of our health system. Indeed, diminishing marginal 
returns (benefits) is the essence o f the argument about appropriate levels of decision 
making for health care, which leads to having ethical implications of various proposals 
relating to health care, e.g. transplants versus dialysis. The curve suggests that the first 
dollars spent on health care buy great improvements in patients’ survival time and/or 
quality o f life. The first $1,000 dollars buys almost two QALYS, the second $1,000 
dollars almost an additional year, etc. In concert with diminishing returns, as the 
expenditures get higher the vertical lines get shorter as smaller and smaller increments of 
health gain result. When looking at an individual’s treatment, the marginal curve leads to 
decision making that is relatively firee o f problems. As more dollars are spent at the
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beginning of an individual’s treatment process, higher gains and quality are the natural 
result. However, towards the end of an individual’s hospital stay when he presumably is 
getting well, the last incremental blood tests or x-rays are yielding considerably less 
benefit per dollar spent. Health economists and medical professionals term this “flat of 
the curve medicine”.*
Another application of the marginal benefits curve is to consider how much of 
any particular treatment should be provided — and thus, given scarcity, how many people 
will be treated. Predicting an individual’s ability to benefit is, of course, not an exact 
science, and predictions based on medical/disease characteristics shared with other 
patients raise problems when considering average benefit as discussed above. In our 
society, it is not one central planner making decisions about how much treatment should 
be provided or to how many; but rather it is a function of a marketplace wherein a 
combination o f patients, doctors, providers, hospitals and insurance plans are making 
those politically sensitive decisions. Therefore when using marginal benefit analysis to 
prioritize access to health care, there will be ethical implications. A third use of the curve 
is in setting of priorities among disease conditions or treatment protocols. For instance, 
in some managed care plans/HMOs certain procedures are placed either higher or lower 
on the curve. Thus prenatal care might be at position one while organ transplants 
conceivably could be in position four or five yielding less marginal benefit -  not to the 
individual, o f course, but to society’s allocation o f resources. The ethical problem with 
using the curve in this way is that no account is taken of the individual patient’s potential 
to benefit.
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Scarcity of Organs for Transplant
Continuing with the themes raised above, the scarcity o f the supply of organs for 
transplant is the dominant factor driving both medical criteria and the many ethical 
considerations involved in recipient selection. Intuitively, everyone knows organ 
transplantation is a costly technology that benefits a relatively small number of people. 
Therefore, a relevant question to ask is how big a demand on societies’ resources is at 
stake? In other words, what does a transplant cost and how many are needed? Medical 
need is something of a difficult issue to precisely define. In fact there is no hard and fast 
definition o f medical necessity. Patients who now need transplants began with the onset 
of some medical condition for which transplantation becomes a “reasonable option”, but 
this depends directly on the strictness of the medical criteria applied in each case. 
Decisions about appropriate medical criteria are always difficult value judgments and 
generally individualized in nature.
When considering scarce resources and need, restrictions like age of potential 
recipients is fairly universally applied in the United States. Patients may be considered 
either too old or too young to benefit from organ transplants. While medical criteria can 
be used to defend the use of age restrictions, applications of age discrimination laws and 
policies in the United States create something of a fine line if cutoff points are to be 
observed. If technology improved and age discrimination/age restrictions were removed, 
the scarcity issues currently affecting the organ transplantation universe would have 
dramatic positive demand side impacts.
As stated above in a discussion on health care and society in general, most believe 
that society has an obligation that some level of health care be available to everyone.
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There is a great deal of evidence of this shared feeling of social responsibility in the 
numerous public and private programs that are devoted to increasing access to care. 
However, critics of many of those programs, especially in this decade, have become 
concerned about the extent of society’s obligation. Again, as mentioned above, health 
care is important but so are other social and private goods. To provide everyone with all 
possible beneficial medical care would be very costly and would require that other 
important needs go unmet. It seems obvious that society’s obligation cannot be 
unlimited. But if this is the case then how much care should a person expect to receive?
The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, 
addressed these issues in a report (now dated but still contextually meaningful) entitled 
'"Secinifig Access to Health Care. The goal was to provide a consistent ethical 
framework for thinking about the allocation of scarce resources in health care. A central 
concept in the commission’s final report was that our society is morally obligated to 
provide access to “an adequate level” of health care — but not an unlimited level.
In the ensuing years, when considering transplantation, medical professionals and 
providers as well as patients are often asked, is it part of an adequate level of care? Since 
there is no consensus on what an adequate level really is, society has been somewhat 
reluctant to face the issue squarely and decide definitively how to allocate organs as a 
scarce resource in an equitable manner. Health officials (across many spectra) who have 
for years promoted organ transplantation apparently have succeeded in getting most 
transplants categorized under the adequate level standard. This has essentially been 
accomplished by piggybacking on the End Stage Renal Disease Program (ESRD) which 
is basically paid for by Medicare. If dialysis which is a remedy, but not a cure for ESRD
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is considered an adequate level, the Task Force on Organ Transplantation reasoned from 
the ESRD experience in its conclusion that organ transplants should be available to all 
without regard to ability to pay with the cost bom by the federal government if 
necessary/" The message has become somewhat muddied. As the ESRD program 
(dialysis) has proven to be very expensive. Congress has been unexpectedly firm in 
refusing to extend the same treatment to other transplants and other health conditions. 
While more than kidneys are now covered by Medicare, blanket coverage for any type of 
transplantation (under Medicare,) is far from reality. There is no real consensus, at least 
in the federal government, that organ transplantations are part of an adequate level.
A fair question at this point might be, what does the cost of the transplant have to 
do with finding and developing methodologies by which the supply of these scarce 
resources can be increased? The enormous dollar cost of transplants has always been part 
of the transplant community’s dialogue among all o f the players and indeed the public.
As a point o f interest at this junction, a significant part of the cost (in the United States at 
least) has been the level o f cost associated with trained and experienced transplant 
surgeons and transplant team members. As a subset of this overall scarcity issue, the 
number within the United States o f such professionals is quite limited, hence their ability 
to command high professional fees in the marketplace. From personal experience, having 
had discussions and conducted interviews with a number of transplant surgeons, a 
quickly obvious conclusion is that a somewhat disproportionate number of that fraternity 
are foreign bom/trained. In a universal consensus their opinion is that the transplant cost 
structure in the United States is somewhat a function of the slowness with which 
transplantation technology developed and evolved from the experimental stages to
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accepted medical practice. In contrast, surgeons from Canada, Britain, the European
Continent, and Japan, have dealt with far less restrictive regulatory restrictions than still
exist in the United States. That slow evolution has enabled many foreign-trained
transplant surgeons to take advantage of market forces and thus command the lofty fees
that we see in evidence today. Nonetheless, over the years a significant number of
remedies, proposals, and incentives have been put forth in order to stimulate the general
public into alleviating the chronic shortage by appealing to rational self interest.
A June 1993 white paper report of the UNOS ethics committee (payment sub-committee)
addressed this issue directly:
The concept that financial incentives be offered as a potential solution to the 
on-going organ donor shortage has been previously considered and debated 
among experts in the fields of transplantation, ethics, law, and economics 
( 1 ), the background for this proposal remains the ever-growing need for increased 
organ acquisition and the undeniable fact that the current system despite 30 years 
o f experience based on altruistic donation has yet to meet this need. Historically, 
the current system of organ donation based on altruism evolved during the 1960s 
and 1970s when issues such as the definition of brain death, the use of donor 
cards, and public attitudes towards donation were only just evolving. Based on 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 
the buying and selling of organs has been specifically prohibited (2), in the late 
1980’s required request legislation was adopted but has yet to demonstrate a 
significant effect in the rate of organ donation.
An accompanying 1993 UNOS sub-committee report identifying potential financial
incentive alternatives for increasing the national supply o f donor organs has not exactly
been “pocket-vetoed”, but nevertheless, remains waiting for action. There is, however,
wide-ranging public dissatisfaction with the current system inadvertently fostering an
imbalance between the need for and supply of organs for transplantation. Consequently,
that public dissatisfaction has fostered a great deal of independent thought and a
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multitude of proposals to reform the system. Current proposals for alleviating scarcity
tend to fall into the below-listed seven categories:
1. A reliance on the market mechanism (direct payment to donors or donor families)
2. Encouraged volunteerism through indirect payments (tax credits to donor families, in- 
kind reward payment of funeral expenses)
3. Encouraged volunteerism through preferred status (persons who declare a willingness 
to be organ donors would in exchange receive preferential status on the waiting list 
for organs themselves)
4. Altering professional behavior (“required request” legislation). This has indeed 
happened and is now law in all states wherein people admitted to hospitals are 
required to officially answer a request for organ donation should they succumb.
5. Increasing the organizational efficiency of organ recovery (consolidating organ 
procurement networks)
6. Change the basic in-hospital admission form from “explicit” to “presumed” consent
7. “Routine salvaging” o f suitable organs after death (with or without a provision for 
patients “opting out”)
Following is a more detailed description and in some cases definition of the mostly
market-based alternatives — all o f which have been given at least some analytical
investigation:
1. A reliance on the market mechanism (direct payment to donors or donor families)
A definition of terms is probably necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of 
financial incentives for organ donation. Financial incentives, or payments as 
discussed here do not mean additional money spent for public or professional
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education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the 
concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ 
procurement, it is argued that the term “donor” would no longer be applicable and 
would need to be replaced by a term such as “vendor"'. The existing term “gift” under 
conditions of any financial considerations might be renamed “rewarded gift”, 
however this appears to be something of an oxymoron. Of significance is the 
distinction between “incentive” and “payment” since a system of financial incentives 
may be a viable option if, “incentives” do not amount to “purchases” (as interpreted 
by law), and “donors” are therefore not transformed into “vendors”.
For purposes of definition, financial incentives should be considered as any 
material gain or consideration obtained by those directly consenting to the process of 
organ procurement, whether it be the organ donor himself in advance of his death, the 
donor’s estate, or the donor’s family. As a substitute for direct payments, which has 
been ethically criticized, a form of “donor insurance” has been suggested whereby an 
individual would agree in advance to donation with payment to his beneficiaries or 
his estate taking place only after donation. This proposal would allow individuals to 
“opt in” to the donation process while still living and their families or estate get 
compensated at the time they actually become donors. For any financial incentive 
plan or proposal to actually take effect, federal and state laws would have to be 
changed which currently prohibit any such payment for anatomical parts.
2. Encouraged volunteerism through indirect payments (tax credits to donor families, in- 
kind reward payment of funeral expenses)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
As a somewhat “softer” proposal, the idea of tax credits or prepaid and/or 
reimbursement for funeral expenses has also been suggested, although to the ethically 
pure, it amounts to the same thing as a straight financial incentive.
3. Encouraged volunteerism through preferred status (persons who declare a willingness 
to be organ donors would in exchange receive preferential status on the waiting list 
for organs themselves)
“Encouraged volunteerism”, which is a term that describes the current state of 
persuading potential donors to be altruistic, can be described as an “opting-in” system 
that requires the direct expressed consent of the donor and, almost always, the 
donor’s family. Therefore in this particular proposal, where payments do not change 
hands, a donor would still be classified as altruistic in that the potential donor in 
exchange for his gift, receives or has some greater status on a waiting list if he were 
ever to need a transplant himself - notwithstanding, of course, any medical criteria 
that would preclude him to be placed on the list in the first place. ' '
4. Altering professional behavior (“required request” legislation). This has indeed 
happened and is now law in all states wherein people admitted to hospitals are 
required to officially answer a request for organ donation should they succumb.
“Required request” offers the opportunity for higher probabilities of organs being 
donated, by virtue of simply asking all admitted patients whether they would consent 
to making the gift should they expire during their stay. There are any number o f 
analogies that would suggest that increasing the frequency of asking for the donation 
would ultimately lead to an increased number of patients responding in the 
affirmative. The reality, however, is that although “on the books” in all 50 states.
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there is very little explanation, education, counseling or guidance. The result is that 
generally the question simply does not get asked.
5. Increasing the organizational efficiency o f organ recovery (consolidating organ 
procurement networks)
Although organizational efficiency has steadily improved in the three decades 
since the first transplantations, and via UNOS there is a central clearinghouse, there 
are still probably far too many local and regional procurement networks operating 
within the United States. This increases redundancy and sets up undesirable and 
time-consuming competitive situations for the scarce and perishable donor organ. 
While regional geographic proximity through local transplant centers is extremely 
important, there are economies of scale that could be gained if more information 
regarding donor organ characteristics matching with recipient requirements were not 
as wide spread and diluted as currently exist.
6. Change the basic in-hospital admission form from “explicit” to “presumed” consent
“Presumed consent” public policies have been described in the literature, and 
have already been implemented in Belgium, Austria, Finland, France, Norway, 
Denmark, and Singapore. Their positive impact on organ supply has attracted 
significant attention in the U.S. The most celebrated and successful of these 
experiences has been Belgium where organ recovery has more than doubled 
following implementation o f its policy o f “presumed consent.” Objections to such 
recovery policies tend to be based on ethical arguments, which ignore efficiency.
Those who advocate presumed consent, in the literature,advance the following 
as its ethical justification: (1) Efficiency is good, increasing the supply o f organs is a
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worthwhile goal. It is sufficiently important to collect more organs, that other goals 
and values within limits may be compromised; (2) Delay in asking for consent can be 
cruel -  presumed consent would eliminate the need to ask the donor’s family for 
consent at a time when the family is grieving; (3) Individual conscience can be 
respected — presumed consent respects the principle of individual choice by giving 
objectors to organ donation an opportunity to empower their anti-donation preference 
by affirmatively objecting and registering it publicly; (4) Individuals owe society the 
effort to register their objection -  those who object to decedent donation should be 
burdened with the task of registering their preference with authorities, because organ 
donation is socially desirable although some have claimed this is a “taking,” if an 
individual has had the opportunitv to choose either way, he is “presumed’" to have 
actually made a choice. (5) Presumed consent, combines the principles of supply side 
efficiency, respect for individual conscience, and an individual’s positive yet 
qualified duty to promote the good of society.
Opponents of presumed consent base their position on the following ethical 
considerations; (1) there will be false positives, that is, persons who were “presumed” 
to consent but who in fact objected to donation -  for a variety of reasons such as 
individuals on the margins of society who did not learn of their option or simply 
failed to register with public authorities their objection; (2) The mechanism for 
registering and transmitting objection status is likely to be inadequate, again harming 
those who in principle object but fail to have their wishes transmitted; (3 ) Individual 
autonomy speaks to a core value — asking individuals to publicly express their
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objection to donation does not respect that individual’s right not to choose: (4) 
Individual’s should have the right to delegate the decision to family members.
While presumed consent legislation is pending in several states in more or less 
similar versions, there is by no means a national consensus on public policy 
approving such a concept. Given the ethical considerations for and against the 
proposal, presumed consent in the United States is likely to be a long drav/n out 
process. Meanwhile, the scarcity of organs in the United States remains a fixture on 
the landscape, unlike the aforementioned countries, which have these enabling 
regulations already in place.
7. “Routine salvaging” of suitable organs after death (with or without a provision for 
patients “opting out”)
Routine salvaging is a policy that is somewhat similar to procurement based on 
presumed consent. The ethical underpinnings, however, are quite different. The 
policy of routine salvaging is inconsistent with liberal individualism. Liberal 
societies assume that the individual, not the state, should control his or her physical 
disposition -  a liberal society respects this principle by asking for the consent of the 
donor before organs are recovered.
In the United States, reforming the organ donation system on the basis of routine 
salvaging would give more authority to the national transplant community than public 
opinion would allow at the present time. Such a reform would require abandoning the 
current commitment to the importance of the individual at least for matters of 
determining how the body is to be treated after death.
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Finally, it is obvious that everyone does not have equitable access to treatments 
that are already standard medical practice. Many citizens in the United States do have 
serious difficulty obtaining health care that is of significant, sometimes even lifesaving 
importance. In fact, kidney dialysis and kidney transplantation are the only expensive 
high technology medical procedures to which access is virtually universally guaranteed. 
While the access may be guaranteed, the shortage continues to plague those in most 
desperate need, and those in need of other organs and/or other high technology 
procedures do not even as yet have the access. The existing organ supply, therefore, is 
clearly inadequate to meet the current and future needs in this country. Donor organs are 
a genuinely scarce resource, and questions of fairness in their procurement and 
distribution are inevitable. It is still speculative to presume that increased educational 
programs, new legal approaches, or financial or other incentives can increase the supply 
of living and/or cadaveric organs.
While they may be speculative, a few of these incentive alternatives are worth 
greater analysis. Futures contracts, presumed consent, required response, and preferred 
status will show up again in Chapter Four in a more complete discussion of these 
alternatives.
We now move to Chapter Three, where, as stated in the introduction, we look at 
the moral, psychological, behavioral, cultural, and racial implications of the decision to 
donate. These and some other factors have throughout the entire history of 
transplantation, significantly impacted the decision to donate by various segments of 
society. Of particular interest, will be an analysis of society’s moral obligation, to be 
followed by a discussion of why minorities are reluctant to donate. As stated in the
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introduction, the linchpin of this thesis is the necessity for a paradigm shift from an 
absolute reliance on altruistic volunteerism, toward a more straightforward recognition of 
an obligation owed by individuals in a society.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE FAILURE OF ALTRUISM
The U.S. organ transplant system is in crisis. At a time when transplant survival 
rates are at an all-time high, the waiting list for organs grows longer every day. 
Approximately 60,000 individuals are now on waiting lists to receive transplantable 
organs. As mentioned in Chapter One, for over five years, only approximately 20.000 
organs (of all types) have been successfully transplanted annually in the United States.
At the same time, the numbers of those who die while on waiting lists also continues to 
grow each year. It has been estimated by UNOS that there are thousands o f individuals 
who remain uncounted because they never make it to a waiting list. .A.t the same time, 
surely there are other thousands of individuals who die with an end-stage organ failure 
who also remain uncounted because they never made it to a list.
For many persons, organ transplantation holds out the only hope of survival; for 
many others, it promises the only hope of survival with a good quality o f life.
Tremendous pressure exists to reform the present organ transplantation system, which has 
been faulted for failing to tap the potential pool of transplantable organs as well as for 
failing to allocate fairly the organs that become available. Although legislation has been 
proposed to address the allocation issues, the underlying problem -  the shortage of
48
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available organs -  cannot be addressed until our society rethinks its approach to organ 
donation. This will require that we stop treating organ donation purely as an act o f 
individual altruism and begin viewing it as a societal and/or a community obligation.
The purpose of Chapter Three is essentially twofold. The primary aim is to look 
deeper into the reasons that individuals, when it comes right down to making choices 
about the ultimate disposition of their bodies, often refuse to seriously consider organ 
donation. This is despite the fact that approximately 80% of the population support the 
concept. So why are most people reluctant to prearrange the event or failing a personal 
decision, why do families veto the life-giving/life-saving gift at an extraordinarily high 
rate? Getting to a moral, ethical, cultural and even racial understanding of the attitudes 
and behaviors of potential donors and their families is the principal task for Chapter 
Three. The second goal for Chapter Three is to sift further the financial and non- 
financial alternatives to altruism listed in Chapter Two. The questions of how they can 
work pragmatically, as well as, the credibility o f establishing a compatibility with 
society’s ethical norms will be asked and answered. Several of the suggested ffee-market 
alternatives will never be implemented, given the general abhorrence society has long 
maintained against (analogously) selling body parts. Yet, in the struggle to improve the 
donor rate, financially compensating donors, may ultimately become part of the solution. 
Therefore, this chapter intends to analyze, discuss and construct moral arguments, with 
the ultimate goal of empowering a policy, that can positively impact the problems/issues, 
while remaining within the bounds of ethical criteria.
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Societal Attitudes Toward Altruistic Organ Donation
Society’s attitudes toward donation are complicated by many factors, which are 
reflected in public opinion polls conducted throughout the past three decades. 
Comparisons are difficult because of a lack of standardization in sampling methods, 
question formats, and polling techniques. Nevertheless, these polls have consistently 
shown that awareness of organ transplantation is very high among the general public and 
that organ donation is perceived as a socially desirable action.
Today, organ transplantation is no longer considered experimental and has been 
proven to increase greatly the quality and longevity of life for thousands of transplant 
patients. Currently, however, approximately sixty thousand patients are awaiting life- 
saving and life-enhancing organ transplants. Unfortunately, while medical and 
pharmacological advances make it possible for greater numbers of people to recover from 
formerly fatal diseases and to live longer lives once they have received organs, as 
discussed previously, the supply of organs has remained relatively static, thereby 
resulting in a critical shortage.
Societal attitudes including cultural values, religious beliefs and death anxiety that 
result in a reluctance to donate organs are among the reasons cited for the shortage. A 
greater understanding of the concerns and beliefs of the general public is necessary to 
effectively target public awareness efforts and ultimately, to stimulate altruism and 
reverse current trends thereby increasing donation. The success of organ donation 
explicitly depends on the altruism of the public. Research continues to show that the 
public, especially white and more highly educated survey respondents, support organ 
donation in broad terms. In addition, surveys of both the general public and actual donor
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families indicate that family members are more likely not to donate organs and tissues if 
they do not know their relatives’ wishes regarding donation and are asked to decide in the 
absence of this information.' The same researchers have concluded that organ donation 
goes more smoothly when the hospital attends to the needs of the donor family, because 
the family gives the gift of the organ, and they expect information, gratitude, or 
recognition in return.
In examining public attitudes towards altruism, one must look at the family.
Thirty years of surveys pointing towards general broad acceptance of donation as a 
socially desirable action, does not explain the intensely personal decision process when it 
comes to one family’s decision process regarding donating their beloved one’s body 
parts. It has been shown that families will explain their decision to donate a member’s 
organ as altruistic when they receive sufficient social support during the donation period. 
Three variables can lead to a positive social construction of altruistic motivation for 
donation; (1) greater personal resources, (2) higher social support, and (3) positive 
evaluations of the donation experience. Another set of variables predicts that reports of 
enhanced coping will be associated with altruistic accounts of donation motivation. 
Further, they will also be associated with these three variables, that is, where families 
have more resources, they will be likely to gamer more social support and to report 
coping more effectively with the crisis of the death of the donor. Another set of variables 
predicts that family members who report fewer personal and social resources will be 
more likely to report conflict about the donation of a relative’s organs. These family 
members are less likely to consider their motivation for donation as altmistic and to find 
fewer coping benefits from the donation." In the spring of 1995, a questionnaire was
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mailed to a sample of 396 families o f cadaveric donors located in the Northeast. South, 
Midwest, and Southwest. The overall response rate was sixty-one percent (242 families 
completed and returned questionnaires). Altruistic motivation was the dependent 
variable studied. Although it is difficult to test empirically the connection between social 
values and altruism, a study of the motivation for organ donation may clarify this 
relation. In the present analysis, altruism was expected to correlate with higher 
socioeconomic status, greater social support, and a positive evaluation of the donation 
experience. In other words, altruism was predicted to be dependent upon the interactions 
of the other three variables. (Batten, 1995)^ Looking at the respondents’ concepts of 
altruism, they were asked how important it was for them to want to help someone else 
and not to waste functioning organs. Between 85% and 90% reported wanting to help 
others, and 75% felt organs should not be wasted.
Personal Resources
As part of Batten’s study, personal resources were hypothesized to be associated 
with reports of altruism. Six characteristics were used in this study to measure 
individual’s personal resources. They are; (I) marital status, (2) income, (3) religious 
identification, (4) religiousness, (5) gender, and (6) age.
Demographic characteristics such as higher education and greater income levels 
are traditionally associated with socioeconomic status. However, because married 
women’s socioeconomic status is more likely tied to their husband’s educational levels 
than their own, the women’s educational status was an inaccurate indicator of the
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family’s socioeconomic status. For that reason, household income was a better measure 
of the donor family member’s socioeconomic status.
Marital status and religious identification were considered indirect measures of 
personal resources. Age may be related to levels of socioeconomic status through the 
connection of age to income. Younger people may have lower incomes because they are 
just beginning their careers. In addition those who are younger may have fewer social 
connections (personal resources), because they have not yet established extensive social 
networks.
Social Support
Social support systems may also influence the expression of altruism. Social 
support for donor family members can come from within the family itself, but it can also 
come from the hospital. Donor family members interact with the institution of the 
hospital and other representatives of the health care system during and following the 
donation.
Family support was measured by five indicators; (1) the number o f people 
involved in the decision to donate, (2) whether or not the family initiated the request for 
donation, (3) how well the family accepted the fact that the donor was brain-dead at the 
time the donation was requested, (4) whether or not the family agreed to a multiorgan 
donation, and (5) whether they donated both the kidneys and the heart. The number of 
deciders was an indicator of the size of the respondent’s support network at the time of 
the donation (Batten p. 87). Indeed, many in the medical ethics community have 
commented that greater social resources ameliorate stress in a crisis. The assumption is
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that the more people are involved who agree with the decision, the higher the 
respondents' degree of social support will be.
When the survey reported that the family raised the option of organ donation and 
the family had accepted the donor’s death when the subject of organ donation was 
broached, it was theorized that the family feels more in control of the donation events.
The assumption here is that better-integrated families will have sufficient resources to 
maintain some control over a situation that is otherwise desperate.
The respondent’s assessment of strong hospital support was hypothesized to be 
associated with altruistic motivation. Support provided to the donor family by nurses, 
physicians, and the organ donor coordinator in the hospital may be a reflection of family 
status. More cohesive families report more positive interaction with hospital staff and 
higher levels of hospital support (Batten p. 88).
Ethical Perspectives on Donation
Shifting the perspective from the quasi-empirical analysis of how altruistic 
motivations might be derived, an ethical and/or moral viewpoint is appropriate to the 
discussion. There are controversies in biomedical ethics that revolve around transfers 
and uses of human body parts. Developments in transplantation and in immuno- 
suppresive drug therapies have raised significant questions about the moral rights and 
obligations of individuals, families, health care professionals, and society at large in the 
transfer and use of human body parts, including; Who owns human body parts? What are 
the moral limits on treating human body parts as property?; and What are the practical 
implications on judgments about ownership in the context of relevant moral principles?
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For purposes of offering an ethical assessment of policies for organ donation, we 
can look to several moral principles or values that have become commonplace in debates 
in biomedical ethics. Several have become widely accepted in the policy arena, and 
could be considered embedded in various policies and practices rather than as grounded 
in any particular moral theology (e.g. church teachings) or moral philosophy. Embedded 
principles are not immune to criticism from the standpoint of ethical theory, and it is 
crucial to be able to move between ethical theory and ordinary general and particular 
moral judgments. This approach to an embedded “common morality” is close to the 
approach o f the common law."* This approach can be assessed according to its capacity to 
illuminate debates about policies of organ procurement and donation.
The relevant imbedded moral principles are respect for persons, including their 
autonomous choices and actions; beneficence, including the obligation both to benefit 
others (positive beneficence) and to maximize good consequences — i.e., to do the 
greatest good for the greatest number (utility); nonmaleficence, the obligation not to 
inflict harm; and justice, the principle of fair and equitable distribution of benefits and 
burdens (President’s Commission, 1983).
In addition to disputes about conflicts among moral principles, our debates about 
public policies for organ procurement and donation involve disputes about the 
appropriateness of viewing human body parts as property. We often think about property 
only in commercial terms, but even the donation of human body presupposes some 
conception of property. Of course, there are different ways to view property. If we view 
property as a bundle of rights, then we must determine who the rights holders are and 
what rights they have.’ Much of the debate about the appropriateness of the language of
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property, hinges on different conceptions of rights of ownership and different conceptions 
of owners. For example, the possible owners of human body parts after an individual’s 
death could be those to whom the individual willed those parts, the family, or the 
community. Possible rights of ownership include the rights to possess, to use, to exclude, 
to destroy, and to transfer.
Do we own our own bodies? That seems like a silly question. Of course we do. 
But do we? Recall from the earlier discussion about the Pennsylvania case {McFall v. 
Shimp), in which a man needed a bone marrow transplant or he would die. The only 
person who had suitable bone marrow was his cousin. His cousin had nothing against 
McFall, the person who needed the marrow. In fact, he liked him. But he was scared.
He refused to donate the marrow, and McFall did what any red-blooded American would 
do — he went to court. He sued for an injunction to order his cousin to give him the bone 
marrow. The court denied the injunction, stating that the precedents did not authorize it, 
as an equity court, to order the injunction. The court expressly made no comment on 
what would happen if the dying man sought damages from his cousin for failing to agree 
to the transplant. Nor, despite some very purple language indicating deep revulsion, 
would the court decide the constitutionality o f a law requiring such transplants to be 
given, should one be enacted. As related in an earlier chapter, McFall died, forgiving his 
cousin.
The Pennsylvania lower court was probably right because our society is still based 
on an autonomistic, libertarian philosophy and this individualistic point of view remains 
at the root o f much o f our law. In other legal systems, there are elements of what is 
referred to as solidarity with others, communitarian or collectivist values. No one today
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goes as far as Marx, who said, “from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his need.”*" In Marx’s terms, it is not what you possess that counts, because you do not 
own that. Rather it belongs to the state, or if the state determines, to someone else in 
need. In our society, however, there are relatively few o f these Good Samaritan-type 
duties.
Although there are not many situations where we say that a person must do 
something to help out another, there are some. In a regime, which forbids abortion, ask 
any woman whether she owns her own body totally or whether, to some extent her body 
is owned by the state. The state then is commanding her to nurture the unborn child at 
least until birth. The point here is that: anti-abortion laws require, at least to some 
extent, that women be Good Samaritans.
Another possible precedent the Pennsylvania court could have used is the 
situation in which the state calls upon us for military service. In the case of conscription, 
our bodies are suddenly not our own anymore. We are obligated to go because our 
bodies belong to the collective. Whether it is for the common good or the common bad 
depends on one’s view o f the particular situation in which one is called upon to fight.
The Pennsylvania court also could have looked to every-day experience to find a 
precedent. For example, every time we allow people to drive in ways that may kill us 
(driving while intoxicated), we are in a way saying that we do not really own our own 
bodies.
There are additional examples. We do not let people sell their bodies. We do not 
let people sell their kidneys. We frown on letting women sell their wombs in cases of 
surrogate motherhood. We do not let people sell their hearts. However, we do let them
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sell their blood and we let them sell their hair and sperm. If  people really owned their 
bodies in the same way that they own property, we would presumably allow people to 
sell all of their body parts.
What then of the constitutional issue? If a legislature passed a law saying that 
everyone that had good bone marrow must give it to people who needed it, would we 
hold that constitutional?
Interestingly several justices and judges have addressed this issue, although 
somewhat indirectly. Based on his discussions of privacy. Justice Brennan probably 
would say that such a law would not be constitutional. He should say that to force 
somebody to give his or her body to someone else would infringe on individual privacy 
and autonomy.^ On the other hand. Judge Robert Bork, if he were true to his position, 
should probably say that he had not read anything in the Constitution that would prohibit 
the forced donation of body parts, and if a legislature were to pass such a law that law 
would be constitutional. He should say that the due process clause talks about property 
and about life in the same terms. “We have allowed all sorts of laws shifting property, so 
why not the same with respect to life?” Thus, if he were true to his position. Judge 
Robert Bork should uphold the statute.^ Fortunately, there is a problem with his position. 
Bork does not take into account what would happen if  instead of a law that required 
everyone to give their bone marrow, the law required only those who have the most 
suitable marrow or kidneys, or livers to give them to people who needed them. If it 
turned out that the people who had the best marrow or kidneys or livers were, just by 
chance, women, or those who had recessive sickle cell anemia (i.e., those we call Blacks), 
or those who have recessive Tay-Sachs (i.e., those we call Jews), we might then be
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concerned about such a law if, in practice, it required only people who had traditionally 
been discriminated against or inadequately represented in the legislature to donate their 
bodies. The law would be passed by the majority, not to discriminate or punish, but more 
insidiously to save those who needed the marrow, as long as those who had to bear the 
burden were not those who elected the legislators. In those circumstances, a law like this 
would have to be constitutionally suspect.
Now consider a communitarian-based law under which, even though women. 
Blacks, or Jews might still be the best donors, everyone would have to be donors because 
we wanted to show that we were all willing to take on the burden. The persecution issue 
would then be totally different. It is unlikely that our legislature would actually do this, 
which again says something about whether or not we as a society are sufficiently 
concerned about “life” to be non-discriminating humanitarians. If we were, that type of 
law might well be constitutional.
Returning to our society, we are not so libertarian or individualistic that a 
legislature would never pass a law giving body part rights to those who need them. But 
we are sufficiently libertarian, individualistic, and autonomistic so that a legislature 
would almost never pass such a law unless the law affected only those who were 
“outsiders.” Such a law could only be constitutional if the burden, in practice, was 
imposed on all of us, and not just on the convenient, traditional “losers.”
Should we be so libertarian with respect to body parts? What are the 
consequences in adopting a system in which the body parts belong to those who need 
them, rather than those who happen to possess them? The first consequence would be
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distributional. Some people who are currently very well off would be harmed, while 
others who are currently in a very bad way would become much better off.
The Individual Libertarian Contract
A brief look at current procurement policy will reveal its libertarian 
underpinnings. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), adopted by all fifty states 
between 1968 and 1973, requires explicit consent of the organ donor. The UAGA’s 
policy o f “encouraged voluntarism” ranks the principle o f self-determination or respect 
for individual autonomy above all other moral principles. One of its key assumptions is 
that a “donor’s” autonomy is duly respected only if an individual contract is negotiated. 
Any procurement policy that does not rest upon consent via a contract is seen by 
proponents of UAGA as riding roughshod over individual liberty, the most treasured 
possession of citizens in a liberal society.
In the context in which a patient’s consent is seen as the deciding factor in 
treatment decisions, consent for obtaining cadaver organs for transplantation is taken to 
be the key condition. O f course, obtaining consent from deceased donors is somewhat 
more complicated than from living patients. The time for obtaining consent is past, once 
the donor is a cadaver and is in a position to “donate.” This leaves society and 
procimement organizations with an up-ffont strategy and a fall-back position; encourage 
people to make decisions about these matters when they are still very much alive (for 
instance, have people sign donor cards); failing that, do what is normally done in 
therapeutic contexts with incompetent and comatose patients -  ask their family for 
consent.
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The starting point of current procurement policy is the individual and his or her 
rights to privacy (the right not to be interfered with) and property (the body viewed as 
property of the deceased) -  the key principles of libertarianism. As mentioned briefly 
above, U.S. procurement policy, has its roots in libertarianism, an individualism that 
rejects the concept of the common good in favor of that of the public interest. Whereas 
the idea of the common good arises from vision of society as a community whose 
members are joined in a shared pursuit of common values and goals and in which each 
individual’s good is bound up with the good of all, the idea o f the public interest arises 
from the vision o f society as an alliance of self-interested individuals who join together in 
the pursuit of mutual advantage. Therefore, any use of an individual’s organs after death 
without that individual’s (or his duly authorized representative’s) express permission is 
seen as trespassing, and as infringing on the most basic rights o f that individual.
Those who argue for fundamental change in organ donation/procurement policy 
must challenge the widely held conviction that explicit consent is a morally necessary 
condition. They must confront the perceived wisdom that any alternative policy that does 
not require explicit consent o f the donor must be rejected on ethical grounds. Typically, 
respect for autonomy in organ procurement policy is identified with explicit consent. I 
think that any procurement policy that actually rides roughshod over autonomy must be 
rejected. The only way an alternative policy that does not require explicit consent can get 
a hearing is to challenge that identification.
In order to challenge the dominance of respect for autonomy and explicit consent 
views, we must consider the appropriateness of modeling organ procurement policy on 
that of patient’s rights.
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“Contract” Autonomy vs. “Citizen” Autonomy 
In the clinical setting, we contract for a cure. But suppose that the procedures 
recommended for the cure require amputating my arm. I may not want that, and I may 
decide to take my chances without the operation. If I am not informed of my alternatives 
and allowed to choose, my autonomy has been violated.
Because people can want things and yet, with perfect rationality not want what 
those things turn out to entail, when we contract to bring about some general end, we 
cannot presume that whatever bringing about the general end requires, is also what is 
wanted. Typically, the clinical setting involves such “conceptual under-determination.” 
By knowing and understanding the general end, we do not necessarily know or 
understand the various means by which the end can be realized.
Not all relationships, however, are contractual. We live by all manner of 
restrictions and policies that are not products of one-to-one contracts. Yet we do not feel 
that our autonomy is being compromised. In a democratic society all manner of social 
policy is generated by legislatures and adopted by and through majority vote of citizens 
or their representatives. Many of these policies deeply and intimately affect individuals. 
With the exception of the extreme libertarians, most generally agree that such social 
policies do not infringe on our autonomy as citizens as long as the policies are enacted 
via the correct procedures for the formulation of social policy and, where necessary 
and/or possible, have “opt-out” clauses.
The question that must be asked is why organ procurement policy must meet the 
conditions of “contract” autonomy, as opposed to the “citizen” autonomy just described. 
Many o f the advocates of current policy simply assume that “contract” conditions must
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be satisfied, because they have (incorrectly) seen the postmortem removal of an organ as 
an analogue of therapy. Again, therapy in this context relates to conditions that must be 
observed with dealing with the incompetent or the comatose. If we free ourselves from 
that model, it is possible to devise a donation/procurement policy that meets the demands 
of autonomy yet does not rest upon explicit consent.
Implications of Nonexplicit Consent 
The implications of such a policy are far-reaching. A policy that does not have to 
meet the condition of explicit consent by each donor holds the promise o f making many 
more life-saving and life-enhancing organs available for transplantation. Such a policy, 
in contrast to the UAGA would not be dependent on the donor card.
That is not necessarily a bad thing, for unfortunately, a variety of problems have 
limited the effectiveness of UAGA. Despite intensive educational efforts, relatively few 
people consider donating their organs. Less than fifteen percent o f the public sign and 
carry donor cards.^ Furthermore, while most donors are victims of motor vehicle 
accidents, when such accidents do occur, emergency personnel frequently fail to search 
for donor cards and even if a properly completed donor card is found, almost all organ 
procurement programs require additional approval from the next of kin, despite the 
provisions of UAGA. Additionally, of the possible fifteen percent of the population 
potentially carrying donor cards, only about twenty percent of that number meet medical 
criteria for donating organs. Finally of that increasingly smaller proportion, an average 
of approximately fifty percent of the remainder are rejected by family members. The 
number of eventual donors who start out carrying donor cards is a very small number.
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The attempt to obtain organs for transplantation using a method so solicitous of 
individual choice is certainly a noble one. Yet the fact that neither now nor in the future 
can we realistically anticipate an adequate supply of organs, if we remain with the current 
policy, certainly suggests that we should search for some altemative(s). Those who reject 
such a search are likely to say that, although the shortage is a tragedy, it is a lesser evil 
than would result from adoption of alternative policies.
Suppose, however, in opposition to those satisfied with current policy, it can be 
demonstrated that more effective policies can give sufficient weight to autonomy or 
individuals’ freedom of choice. Would it not then be incumbent upon us to pursue such a 
policy?
Reluctance to sign a donor card is not the only problem with donor cards. Despite 
the efforts over many years to get people to sign cards and with the weight of the law 
behind them, an unanticipated problem has arisen: transplant teams hesitate to act on the 
basis of a signed donor card, deferring instead to the family of the deceased. Despite 
UAGAs attempt to make the wishes of the deceased controlling, it is the family’s 
(wishes) that are. UAGA specifically stipulates that in case of conflict the expressed 
wishes o f the deceased are to take priority. The family therefore, remains at the heart of 
the matter. Typically the family is consulted even if a donor card has been signed and if 
they object to the donation, its not likely that the organs will be removed. On the other 
hand, if there is no signed donor’s card, the law states that the next-of-kin are to make the 
decision. Either way, the family is in the controlling position. It is they who, in their 
most intense moment of grief, are asked to grant permission to have their loved one’s 
organs removed to possibly benefit someone else.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
Moral Obligations
At this time we have no legal obligations to give our body’s parts or products to 
another, but might we or our surviving family representatives have moral obligations to 
do this? Yes, under certain circumstances we may have moral obligations to give or 
donate body parts or products to another.
As examples, recently there have been cases where a mother gave a lobe of her 
liver to her child. It is known that the liver can regenerate itself so the mother may not 
suffer any long-term harm from her donation, although the pain and the risk of the 
procedure should not be made light of. The hope is that the child’s immune system 
would accept the mother’s liver as a close match, and that the liver might grow with the 
child. In another recent case a mother donated a part o f her lung to her child. This too 
was seen as an experiment with no benefit assured and with risks to both participants. 
Skeptics might ask: should parents even be permitted to do such a thing? Most people 
would say, of course, if a child were gravely ill and there was something, even though 
risky and painful, that a parent might do to save him or her, the parent should be allowed 
to do it. What reasons would one give to defend a choice to make such a gift? In the 
“libertarian, individualistic, and autonomistic” culture we inhabit, many are quick to cite 
a right to control one’s own body, perhaps grounded on a legal right to privacy. Giving a 
piece o f an organ seems dramatic perhaps, but not so different in kind from other things 
we are asked to do for our children’s benefit. Should others be permitted to interfere with 
our fulfilling our moral obligations to our children?
The problem with talking about moral obligations in the two hypothetical 
extensions of realistic examples just mentioned, is that it is hard to imagine saying that
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any parent is obliged to participate in such risky, desperate, long-shot attempts. But 
suppose that the costs of helping -  the pain and risks -  were reduced to a minimum, and 
that the potential benefits were made more probable and no less significant: might we 
then be willing to say that parents can indeed have a moral obligation to give some body 
part or product if it will almost surely save their child’s life?
Parents have a range of moral obligations. We do not require them to do what is 
impossible or futile, nor do we require them to sacrifice completely their own interests or 
the interests of others for the sake of their children, but we do expect them to accept 
minor inconveniences and even a little pain if their children might benefit enormously 
from it.
In the case of organs for transplant, for many people the needs of others become 
the grounds of moral obligation. If  we are selfish or indifferent toward the needs of 
others, while hoarding the resource we possibly let ourselves open to the same 
accusations leveled against the very wealthy that they should respond generously to 
others’ needs. We should not be surprised that the accusation with respect to body parts 
is just now (within the last twenty years) being uttered. Until the time that body parts or 
substances actually could assist in another’s need, it made no sense to accuse someone of 
holding back that which could not benefit another.
Understanding the need and accepting that obligation follows, does not mean that 
we must respond to every individual in need. And it most certainly does not mean that 
the state is justified in insisting that we satisfy such needs. But it does mean something.
Suppose the facts of the case were a bit different than those presented to the judge 
in McFall v. Shimp. Let us say that bone marrow transplantation for the particular
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
disease had advanced to the state where, when a well-matched donor could be found, a 
near-certain cure was the likely outcome and the alternative was death. The reluctant 
could-be marrow donor was the patient’s son, whom the patient-father had raised 
lovingly and generously. The marrow extraction procedure was virtually pain - and risk 
free. The son nevertheless, refused.
This son has acted in an ungrateful and cowardly manner. His father’s impending 
death will be further blighted by the knowledge that the son has failed to exhibit the 
moral virtues the father had exemplified and tried to impart. He not only dies, but dies 
knowing he failed as a parent, with his own preventable death the proof o f that failure.
Did the son in this case fail utterly to do his moral duty? Yes, probably, however 
as the relationship between prospective donors and those in need grows more distant and 
anonymous, the case for a strong moral obligation becomes less compelling.
This should not be surprising. Judgments of moral obligation in complex 
circumstances share similar characteristics: a number of relevant moral considerations of 
varying weight including the consequences to the various parties, promises made, the 
strength and intimacy of relationships, and the like. As the circumstances change, moral 
judgments may become less certain until finally the balance tips in the other direction.
The law already supports the moral duty to give body parts to others in need. It 
does so with blood, other tissues and whole organs through the various statutes that 
permit donation from cadavers and occasionally living donors. Laws such as these 
support people’s fulfillment of their moral duties, but do not force them to do so.
Donating organs and other body parts has been described as a moral duty, because if one 
pays attention to the reasons people give for making such donations, they are frequently
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couched in the language o f obligation. Studies of living-related kidney donors show that 
the decision to donate is most often made immediately; people usually do not need a 
great deal of convincing when a sister, brother, mother, father, or child needs a kidney. 
These actions are usually seen as evidence that people recognize their moral duty to 
donate in such circumstances.
The benefits o f a system of gifts of organs or other body parts are subtle but far- 
reaching. Gifts of blood, other tissues, and whole organs attest to our connectedness with 
one another, our shared embodiment, and our always tenuous and threatened grasp on 
health. Especially in large impersonal societies where bureaucracies mediate between 
any one person’s resources and the needs of others, gifts of the body are a symbolically 
rich way to reaffirm the value o f solidarity, that we are in fact, members of one 
community, responsive to one another’s needs (Murray, 1987).^“
Following Murray’s further reasoning (1991), I contend that there might well be 
circumstances in which we have moral obligations to give parts of our bodies to others. 
These moral obligations will grow more visible and compelling as the likely benefits to 
others grow more dramatic and certain and the risks to donors become minimal.
Why People Are Reluctant to Donate
Behavioral change models and theories outline the complex process of individual 
change. Trial o f a new behavior, such as family discussion and acceptance of organ 
donation intentions follows a sequence of events: awareness, understanding, interest, 
acceptance, personalization, and decision-making related to the issue. Fishbein and 
Ajzen’s “Theory o f Reasoned Action” is described as state o f the art for predicting
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specific behavior intention as well as personal decision-making in performing or not 
performing a behavior/'* Their six-step process can be used to explain virtually any 
behavior over which an individual has volitional control. Of course, this contemporary 
vision is not exactly new. Aristotle, writing in Nicomachean Ethics nearly 2400 years 
ago, espoused these same themes.*^ Nevertheless, Fishbein and Ajzen’s views address 
the organ donor issues rather well.
The Theory of Reasoned Action offers guidance to tracking the public’s 
knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors to assess whether and what changes are occurring in 
organ donation. It permits modifications of motivational strategies as the public views 
change. These motivational strategies can lead to effective mass media campaigns to 
increase awareness of the shortage of organ donors and establishes it as a priority of 
concern. It is clear that while public education messages have been consistent in 
focusing on the beneficial and altruistic nature of donation and have been successful in 
reinforcing the value o f donation to the white majority, they have failed to address the 
needs and concerns of substantial segments o f the total population. Public education 
efforts can affect donation rates only if they are targeted at those who are not already 
committed, especially minorities or those with little formal education.
Currently, donor education falls dramatically short of this goal. Its messages 
revolve around slogans about the need for organs or the moral worth of donation -  
matters undisputed by, but uninteresting to, the key target populations. The challenge of 
public education is to convey the dual message that organ donation protects rather than 
endangers the interests of potential donors (via the creation of a nationwide advertising 
campaign focusing on the pre-death benefits that accrue by altruistically doing the right
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thing). Globally, changes must be made both to the content of the messages conveyed 
and in the mechanisms used to transmit these messages to the appropriate target 
populations.
Reluctance of Minorities to Donate 
As minority populations experience rapid growth in the United States, it becomes 
increasingly important to recognize and understand cultural differences that influence 
these segments of the population, particularly in relation to health matters. African 
Americans, Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders and American Indians remain fairly 
unaware about organ and tissue donation even though data show an unabated need for 
donors from these subgroups.
In a review of common reasons for the reluctance of minorities to donate organs 
for transplantation, it was found that major barriers stand between many of the above 
listed minority groups and their willingness to donate.'^ These barriers include;
• Distrust of the white majority group, of which most physicians and health care 
workers are a part.
• Cultural differences in communications between ethnic minorities and health care 
personnel.
• Belief that physicians would prematurely declare a minority patient dead in order to 
surgically remove an organ for transplantation to a patient of the majority group. This 
belief may be held more strongly by minority group members of low socioeconomic 
status, who also believe that the organ will likely be donated to an affluent patient.
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• Religion and/or superstition, such as some Native American’s belief that the body 
must remain intact after death in order to become part of the great ancestral society.
• Lack of awareness of the need for donated organs, which may be a result o f the lack 
of exposure to information about organ donation and transplantation due to isolation 
from mainstream society.
• Lack of faith in the success of transplantation, probably more prevalent among 
members of groups with low socioeconomic status, regardless of race or ethnicity.
• Intense emotional state of the family, which may include hostility toward physicians 
or others who approach the family about donation. The frequency of this occurrence 
may be reduced if willing donors make their families aware of their wishes in 
advance.
Improving Aftican-American Donation Rates 
Blacks/African Americans are the largest racial minority group within the U.S. 
population, constituting approximately twelve percent of the total population. Like the 
other identifiable ethnic/racial groups. Blacks appear to have a predisposition for 
developing certain health problems. For example. Blacks have a greater risk (1.3 times) 
of dying from heart disease, have twice the chance of succumbing to the complications of 
diabetes, and are 3.2 times more likely to develop kidney failure than is the white 
population.*^
Hypertension, a common health problem of many Blacks, is a major contributor 
to the development and/or complications of these diseases. Hypertension affects about
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one-fourth of the Black population, whereas it is present in only about one-tenth of the 
White population (Funkhouser and Moser, 1990).
Another chronic condition that disproportionately affects the Black population is 
diabetes. Blacks develop diabetes at a higher rate (1.3 times) than do Whites, and this 
condition magnifies the clinical consequences of hypertension. Patients with both 
hypertension and diabetes have increased risks of developing heart disease, stroke, 
blindness, and kidney failure. As a group. Blacks constitute about twelve percent of the 
nation’s population, yet account for approximately thirty percent o f all treated end-stage 
renal disease (ESRD) patients.** For those affected by ESRD, dialysis continues to be the 
most common treatment. Blacks account for nearly forty percent of this country’s 
dialysis patients (Plawecki & Plawecki, 1992). Unfortunately, the number of Blacks on 
dialysis who are also on waiting lists for kidney transplantation continues to grow due to 
an insufficient number of available/suitable organs.
The number of Black patients on dialysis and on waiting lists for transplantation 
greatly exceeds the percentage of that same race who will donate organs. The reasons for 
the low levels o f organ donation by the Black community (as a subset of the minority list 
stated above), have been identified as; (1) lack of information about kidney 
transplantation; (2) religious fears and superstitions; (3) distrust of health care providers; 
(4) fear that donors would be declared dead prematurely; and (5) racism (Blacks would 
prefer to give their organs to other Blacks).*^
Other considerations that may negatively affect organ donation decisions include 
the characteristics of the facility. As a group. Blacks visit physicians’ offices less 
frequently, relying on hospital clinics and emergency rooms for their health care (DHHS,
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1985). The often chaotic, businesslike, depersonalized nature of care delivery in these 
facilities may interfere with the sensitivities of the organ procurement interchange and 
discourage potential Black donors. This factor is confirmed by data that demonstrate that 
the most likely locational source of organs for transplant were the inner-city hospitals, 
which serve large minority populations.^**
The lower organ donation rate for Blacks may decrease the likelihood that 
acceptable donor/recipient matching will occur. Lower donation rates also extend the 
patient’s time on dialysis, progressively lengthen the list of potential recipients, and 
ultimately decrease the likelihood of success for transplantation.
The differences o f frequency of ABO blood groups between the races is one 
factor that reduces the likelihood of Blacks’ receiving a kidney transplant. Of Whites, 
forty percent have blood group A, whereas only approximately twenty-seven percent of 
Blacks have that same blood type. Proportionally, almost twice as many Blacks (twenty 
percent) have blood group B, whereas only eleven percent of Whites have that same 
blood group."*
There is another factor that influences recipient selection and it is extremely 
significant. That factor is the compatibility of human leucocyte antigens (HLA). The 
greater the HLA compatibility between the donor and recipient, the more likely that a 
patient will receive a transplant. “Blacks have a more diverse group of HLA molecules 
than Whites. This genetic diversity makes it difficult to find an HLA matched kidney for 
a Black recipient when the donor pool is predominantly White” (Plawecki & Plawecki, 
1992).
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HLA frequency differences between the races might affect an equitable 
distribution of kidneys when the allocation system is heavily weighted for matching -  
indeed, as it is.“^  HLA matching correlates favorably with transplant outcome. “Blacks 
would benefit from well-matched kidneys if more donors of that race were available” 
(Lazda & Blessing, 1989). Of cadaver kidneys, seventy-five percent are recovered from 
non-Black donor groups. Based on HLA frequency. Blacks therefore, have less chance 
o f favorable matching and, consequently of obtaining a kidney. “These results 
systematically and dramatically indicate the need for an increase in organ donation 
among the Black population” (Plawecki & Plawecki, 1992).
What can be done to improve the Black donation rate? Several matters must be 
taken into consideration:
• It is essential to keep Blacks/African-Americans involved in the planning as well 
as the implementation process of various strategies and activities within their 
communities. Their participation allows them to recognize that they are 
responsible for becoming a part of the solution to a national problem — a donor 
shortage.
• The utilization of key persons such as transplant recipients, donors, transplant 
candidates, and donor families as advocates for the cause must continue. Their 
personal experiences lend enormous credibility to the message that health 
professionals deliver.
• The public and private sector must share in the responsibility of educating the 
Black/African American community by pooling together resources which will
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allow for the creation of additional marketing materials that can be disseminated 
and used to educate the community.
• The media must continue to project and target positive messages at the Black 
community regarding organ and tissue donation.
In a community-based, grass-roots effort, all o f the above mentioned elements together 
hopefully, can and will make a difference in how the community responds to the need.
Hispanic Donor Attitudes 
Documented Hispanics make up slightly less than ten percent of the American 
population in the United States, however, their numbers are rising fast and are expected 
by the end of the century to be the largest minority in the United States. Hispanics 
represent about six percent of donors, about 8.5 percent of recipients, and a similar 
number on dialysis and on transplantation waiting lists as of December 31, 1997.^ Over 
the last fifteen years, there have been a number of studies that have pointed to the 
extremelv low donation rates among both Blacks and Hispanics. Hispanic donation rates 
run even lower than those of the Black population. In Chicago, Poliak showed, in 1985, 
that family refusal rates of Hispanics were sixty percent vs. thirty percent in Whites.""* In 
1993, Frottas found a zero percent to twenty percent organ donation rate in Blacks, 
compared to a percentage for Hispanics that was rarely greater than five percent."' He 
concluded that, as far as the predilection for kidney failure and unwillingness to become 
organ and tissue donors. Blacks and Hispanics have much in common. The major 
difference is that Hispanics do as well after transplantation as do Whites, while Blacks 
have ten to twenty percent poorer graft survival rates. Conversely, Hispanics fair poorly
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on dialysis, while Blacks fair better than all other ethnic groups as far as patient survival 
on dialysis.
The main contributor to the poor rate of donation among Hispanics, is that year in 
and year out more than fifty percent o f potential donors are rejected because of family 
refusal. The following factors have been identified by UNOS as contributing reasons for 
family rejection:
• Hostility is invariably present in the dynamics o f families with divorced parents or 
relatives, broken homes, and situations where both parents had argued about 
which one had given permission to their child for the particular activity where the 
accident or fatal trauma occurred.
• Fear of mutilation and suffering is frequently verbalized, although relatives can 
barely define the nature and cause of the fear. Relatives often do not accept the 
argument that the dead relative was not suffering because he was dead.
• Denial of death is a frequent rejection rationale, especially when the family can 
see the breathing movements caused by an artificial respirator, notwithstanding a 
verification o f brain-death.
• Religion is occasionally a factor in family rejection. However, in most 
circumstances, religion works in favor of donation.
• A very important factor in refusal is “the extended family.” With Hispanics, 
decisions are frequently made at family reunions and discussions. Thus, even 
with the presence o f the next-of-kin in the hospital, a family often prefers to wait 
for other relatives, either senior or prominent members o f the family living 
elsewhere and who are considered to be the successful members of the family.
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Also much weight and consideration is given to the opinion of the elders of the 
family, i.e., grandparents, even if they lack elements for adequate decision­
making. The wait for all these members, as well as the frequently hostile, 
adamant, attitude of some o f the extended family frequently influences the next- 
of-kin against donation.
• For Hispanics, the problem of “collective hysteria” is ever-present in the 
dynamics of organ procurement during the grieving process.
Religious Views on Organ Donation
While it is usually possible to find degrees o f divergence of view within a 
particular religion, there are very few religions for which organ transplantation or organ 
donation conflicts with fundamental tenets. It is far more common for cultural (as 
discussed above for minorities), as opposed to religious, beliefs to conflict with donation. 
Often, over the preceding thirty years (of transplantation history), it has been difficult for 
the individual to interpret the view of their religion without some leadership. Failure to 
acknowledge the dilemmas and difficulties that modem medical therapies confront the 
individual with, would represent an abrogation of religious responsibility and most major 
religions have thus addressed the donation issue.
The definition of religious attitudes to organ donation has been tied to the 
progression of understanding of the potentials o f transplantation. A therapy that is 
experimental, uncommon and of unproven benefit such as cardiac transplantation in the 
1960’s or baboon liver transplantation in the 1990’s, attracts one level of religious 
analysis. A therapy that is standard, common and o f proven benefit, joins the health
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measures that together can be seen as a society’s fulfillment of providing a right to health 
for its members. The rate at which the different religions have needed to address the 
theological issues has been partly dependent upon the stage and development of medical 
services. The converse of this is that interaction of religious stances, cultural views and 
medical technology has determined the delivery of service to each community. Where 
the religious and cultural views are not permissive, such as in Japan, lack of cadaveric 
organ donation has prevented delivery of transplantation therapies to large proportions of 
the community despite the technical ability to do so.
It is the approach to the dead body that provides most religions with the 
underlying principles that establish their viewpoints. In Japanese society the Shinto view 
o f the dead body as an impure and dangerous object has been a basic concept for at least 
a thousand years. Injuring the dead body, for example by organ donation, has 
implications in the Japanese culture that are deeply imbedded in belief and ritual, that is 
aggravated by a general public misunderstanding of brain death."^ While some religions 
draw on their understanding of human death to interpret the demands of organ donation 
and thus find broadly held views, other religions find diversity. Following are capsule 
summaries of several o f the world’s major religions’ viewpoints on organ donation as 
discussed in the journal L//è Cycles in its Summer 1987 edition:
• Amish -  the Amish consent to transplantation if they know it is for the health and 
welfare of the transplant recipient. They are reluctant, however, to donate their 
organs if  the recipient and/or the outcome are not identifiable.
• Buddhism -  Buddhists believe that organ donation is a matter that should be left 
to an individual’s conscience. There is no written resolution on the issue
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• Catholicism -  Catholics view organ donation as an act of charity, fraternal love 
and self-sacrifice. Transplants are ethically and morally acceptable to the 
Vatican. Pope John Paul U has expressed considerable concern about donor’s 
psychological and physical integrity, but he has not taken any position against 
organ transplantation.
• The Church o f Christ Scientist -  Christian Scientists do not take a specific 
position on transplants or organ donation. Christian Scientists normally rely on 
spiritual, rather than medical means for healing. The question o f organ donation 
is left to the individual church member.
• Hinduism — Hindus are not prohibited by religious law from donating their 
organs. The act is an individual decision.
• Islam — In 1983, the Moslem Religious Council originally rejected organ donation 
by followers of Islam, but it has reversed its position, provided donors consent in 
writing prior to their death.
• Judaism -  Judaism teaches that saving a human life takes precedence over 
maintaining the sanctity of the human body. A direct transplant is preferred.
• Mormons — The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints considers the 
decision to donate organs a personal one. Mormons must individually weigh the 
advantages and disadvantages of transplantation and choose the one that will give 
them peace and comfort. The Church does not interpose any objection to an 
individual decision in favor of organ donation.
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• Protestantism — Protestants encourage and endorse organ donation. The
Protestant faith respects an individual’s conscience and a person’s right to make
decisions regarding his or her own body.
New Strategies and Frameworks
Signs are abundant that the current organizational and legal framework regulating 
donation is perceived as failing the needs of transplantation. The current framework, 
sometimes described as “encouraged volunteerism” may be characterized as an “opting- 
in” system that requires direct expressed consent o f the donor and, almost always the 
donor’s family. “Dissatisfaction with the current regime stems from a progressive 
widening of the tragic imbalance between the need for and supply of solid organs for 
transplantation.”^^  Consequently, a wide-ranging public discussion has focused on the 
imperative o f reforming the laws governing organ recovery. In recent years, a multitude 
of ideas has been presented to alleviate the situation and reform the system. Although 
none of the following has been nationally implemented, given current law and lack of 
consensus on the best choice, the reform proposals fall into the following categories:
1. Reliance on market mechanisms -  financial compensation of one sort or 
another, e.g., direct payments before death to donors, prepaid medical and life 
insurance, payment contracts to heirs, and “futures” contracts — financial 
arrangements made in the present for delivery at some future date.
2. Greater encouraged volunteerism through “indirect” payments — tax credits, 
in-kind rewards like funeral expenses.
3. Greater encouraged volunteerism through preferred status -  an individual’s 
expressed willingness to donate yields him/her a preference in the waiting 
queue for that individual (or in a further alternative a close relative)
4. Improving health care professional behavior — legislation strengthening the 
required request laws that already exist.
5. Increasing the efficiency of organ recovery organizations — although UNOS is 
the federally chartered national clearinghouse for all transplantation, 
medical/surgical information, pharmacology research, as well as a bioethical
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focal point — actual procurement is done regionally and even locally at 
transplant centers (hospitals) around the country. The current structure grew 
out o f the perishability issues relating to the survivability of organs 
themselves. However, there is some inefficiency and under-allocation of 
these scarce resources. Since April, 1998, reports of the establishment o f a 
single national waiting list for the various organs suitable for transplantation 
have gained renewed credibility. That is when U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) announced new policy initiatives.
6. Changing o f the basis from “explicit” to “presumed” consent. This would 
have major ramifications and dramatically impact the quantity of donated 
organs.
7. Routine “salvaging” of suitable organs with or without provision for “opting 
out” or having to request consent.
8. Eliciting and empowering donor preferences by “requiring/mandating their 
response/choice” -  a reciprocal situation with required request, in that the 
respondent is required to make a choice either for or against donation” prior to 
receiving e.g. a drivers license, registering to vote, or filing a will etc. 
(Childress, 1989).
9. Organ sales -  the classic oxymoron of “rewarded gifting”
As stated - all o f the above proposals have been studied previously and yet none to date 
have gained a consensus in any important arena. However, as explored throughout this 
thesis, and as referenced by Deborah Stone,** the sheer numbers/statistics involved in the 
transplant universe -  operations performed, people waiting on lists, people dying while 
waiting on lists -  all o f which, of course, relate to donor shortage, shout out for some 
very near-term action review of these proposed policy solutions. In conducting my 
research for this thesis, I have looked at and evaluated all of the above. I shall now turn 
to two of the most viable.
Two Strategies
What politically courageous solution can be implemented to head off the 
impending crises in transplantation? It is clear that altruism has failed to even closely 
match the tremendous advances in transplantation technology. And clearly, the shortage
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of organs for transplantation results in an unacceptably large number of potentially 
preventable deaths. I will now proceed to examine two proposals that appear to have the 
highest propensity for success while still incorporating high levels of respect for 
individual’s rights and preferences.
Under presumed consent, it would be assumed that consent to remove the 
cadaveric organs has been given by donors unless they or their families pre-register an 
objection. In contrast, the current system affords people the opportunity to “opt in” to the 
organ donation system by signing a donor card or otherwise expressing their desire to be 
organ donors. Again, under presumed consent, individuals would be in the system unless 
they decide to “opt out” by pre-registering their refusal to donate.
Presumed consent raises important ethical concerns that preclude its use when 
there is no effective mechanism for documenting and honoring decisions to “opt out” of 
the system. However, when there is an effective “opting-out” system, presumed consent 
may be ethically acceptable. Actually, presumed consent currently exists in several 
states. Most states have laws which permit coroners or medical examiners to remove 
corneas, pituitary glands, and other tissues specified by statutes from cadavers where 
there is no knowledge of objection to removal from the decedent or the decedent’s 
family. In some states, these laws have been challenged on Constitutional grounds. 
Complainant’s have claimed that removing organs in the absence of any objections, 
rather than with the donor’s or the family’s express consent, violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition on the taking of private property without due process and just 
compensation. Recent court decisions'® suggest that any constitutionality of presumed 
consent may be in doubt when there is not an effective system for documenting and
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honoring objections to donations. However, “when there is an effective opting out 
system, most legal commentators agree that presumed consent is constitutional.” *^* In 
1993 both Maryland and Pennsylvania passed limited presumed consent laws/statutes 
according to earlier preferences stated by the donor, which have been ruled as effective 
and requiring no further consent upon death. Texas is the first state allowing retrieval of 
organs without explicit consent, albeit in limited circumstances. Texas law allows the 
retrieval o f organs if the decedent's next of kin caimot be reached for a consultation after 
reasonable efforts have been made. After the donor’s family is contacted, the wishes of 
the next-of-kin are respected unless the potential donor had expressed a preference for 
donation during his or her lifetime. According to the law, preferences for donation are to 
be elicited in a manner that anticipates the policy of “required response”.
Presumed consent may do a better job than a system o f expressed consent in 
making more organs available for transplantation. A comparison o f six European 
countries in 1993 showed significantly higher rates of organ transplantation in Belgium, 
France, and Austria, which operate under presumed consent, than in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and the Netherlands which operate under an “opting in” system.^* Belgium 
experienced a reported 140% increase in the total numbers available for transplantation 
after it moved from an expressed-consent system to a system of presumed consent. (L. 
Roels, et.al. pg. 2078).
Presumed consent may be effective by changing the consent process in ways that 
at first, many Americans might find undesirable. For instance, the way in which 
presumed consent facilitates organ procurement, thereby reducing the role of family input 
in the decision-making process actually might be objectionable. In fact, in some
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European countries operating under presumed consent, family input is eliminated (L. 
Roels, et. al., pg. 2078). According to the Roels paper, many Europeans argue that it is 
more humane not to discuss the issue of organ donation with the family because such 
discussions only add an extra burden to their grief. This appears to be an ethically 
troublesome sub-issue o f presumed consent. Consulting with the donor’s family, 
imposes an obstacle to effective and increased donation rates, but is nearly an absolute 
requirement in American transplant centers. In America, when the prospective donor’s 
views are in doubt, family input is viewed as ethically required to provide additional 
insight into the donor’s probable wishes. The family’s decision-making authority derives 
from its knowledge of the deceased’s values and beliefs and in its general right to make 
decisions for a family member who lacks decision-making capacity. Again, as stated 
earlier in this paper, in America, asking for permission is a difficult proposition both for 
the hospital and procurement staff personnel as well as the grief stricken families.
Thus, presumed consent is actually more likely than systems of expressed consent 
to harvest organs against the true wishes of individuals and their families. More organs 
would certainly be procured under presumed consent, but only because it takes advantage 
of the public’s general reluctance to directly dissent (taking advantage of the grief 
stricken’s temporary confusion whereby those who may not wish to donate, nevertheless, 
fail to register their objection). If  one goal of the organ procurement system is to avoid 
organ harvesting against the individual’s true preferences, a better approach would be to 
encourage or even require individuals to make their preferences clearly known in 
advance.
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Mandated Choice/Required Response
Transplantation literature refers to the above two sub-titles synonymously. 
Henceforth in this thesis I will use the term required response in the discussion. Under 
required response, individuals would be required to state their preferences regarding 
organ donation when they renew their driver’s licenses, file tax forms, or perform some 
other task mandated by the state. Requiring a decision regarding donation would 
overcome a major obstacle to organ donation -  the reluctance o f individuals to 
contemplate their own death and the disposition of their bodies after death -  nevertheless, 
individual autonomy would be protected.
Public opinion polls have shown that one major reason why people currently do 
not sign donor cards (or otherwise indicate a desire to be donors), even when they support 
the concept of organ donation, “is a wide-spread reluctance to consider one’s own death 
and the prospect of bodily mutilation that organ harvesting would entail.” *^ Under 
required response, individuals who feel this reluctance would have to confront it thereby 
removing it as a barrier to donation.
Requiring individuals to make a choice about organ donation may be considered 
to be coercive or an invasion of privacy. When the costs of required response are 
compared with the social benefits of such a policy, this objection appears to hold little 
weight. Required response could be carried out in conjunction with many other state- 
mandated tasks, such as renewing a driver’s license, and would not require additional 
expenditures of time and energy by the individual or personnel receiving the response. 
Given the pressing need for organs, requiring merely that a choice be made seems a small 
price to pay for the possibility of saving more lives. Just by definition, coercion involves
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narrowing options for the coerced, requiring a response is in no way coercive, in that 
individuals who do not want to donate are free to say no.
In the opening paragraph of this thesis, I mentioned the importance of individual 
autonomy. That brief reference is meant to convey an importance that is recognized 
throughout the transplant universe. Requiring that competent adults making donation 
decisions for themselves, in advance of illness, promotes individual autonomy. The 
importance of individual responsibility in medical decision-making is well established 
and rests on a fundamental right to self-determination on matters of great personal 
importance. Under most circumstances, the course of action that will best promote a 
person’s well-being rests on subjective judgments that only the person is in the position 
to make. Individual autonomy also reflects Western society’s additional respect for the 
unique worth of the individual.
An individual’s interest in controlling the disposition of his/her own body and 
property after death suggest that it is ethically preferable for the individual, rather than 
the family, to decide to donate organs. This view is supported in the law as well. It is 
specifically stated in the UAGA act referred to in Chapter One.
By requiring that individuals make their preferences clear, required response 
would reduce the stress the current system places on the families and physicians of dead 
or dying patients whose organs could be suitable for harvesting. Under the current 
system, “required request” laws mandate that physicians or hospital staff ask the 
decedent’s family for permission to remove organs when the decedent’s own preferences 
are unknown. Grieving families may resent the timing of such request, which usually 
must be answered within a few hours for the organs to remain viable for transplantation.
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As stated earlier, hospital staff are often quite reluctant to confront grieving families with 
this request, resulting in organs not donated.
Digressing slightly to a related concept, a reference to existing policy issues 
related to the donor card is appropriate. The policy status quo is a state-centered 
approach relying on driver’s licenses and other official documentation. The approach is 
uncoordinated across the states. Not only is there no centralized collection of donation 
preferences, but not even the same relevant data points are collected (decisions made by 
donors relating to all or which organs they consent to donate). A policy of required 
response would replace wasteful uncoordinated state level programs with a uniform 
method of collecting and disseminating donation preferences, most likely through UNOS. 
A national approach is needed to assure the routine and uniform collection of donation 
preference data and its further distribution to organ procurement centers -  located 
regionally around the country.
Donation preferences likely should be recorded in a UNOS database accessible by 
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPO). These preferences will carry a legal weight. 
Following death declarations, the OPO will have the legal authority to excise organs fi’om 
a deceased person who had expressed a pro-donation preference. The recorded 
preference would be shown to the donor’s family in order to acquire their cooperation. 
Required response would increase the supply of donated organs by decreasing the 
frequency of refusal by donor families and by granting additional legal protection to 
OPOs. Although required response may not completely suppress the efforts of some 
families to overrule decedents’ preferences regarding donation, it could discourage most 
“family vetoes” by making the decedent’s wishes indisputably clear.
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There is also empirical evidence that required response would be acceptable to the 
public and therefore exponentially effective in increasing the organ supply. In a survey 
of public opinion, approximately “90% of respondents indicated that they would support 
such a program. Support for presumed consent, the other policy proposal studied in this 
survey, was only 60%.”^^
Given the high likelihood of public acceptance of required response and its 
reliance on voluntary choices of autonomous individuals, required response is a 
promising strategy for increasing the supply of organs for transplantation and should 
continue to be pursued.
For many years, proponents of the current organ-donation system have argued 
that all that is needed to create an adequate supply of transplantable organs is to educate 
the public and to a lesser extent, health care professionals, about the need for organ 
donation. As I have pointed out in this chapter, however, this approach has not been 
sufficient.
Some proponents o f presumed consent, reject the traditional emphasis on 
individual autonomy in donation decisions. Placing too great an emphasis on individual 
rights and autonomy ignores fundamental moral obligations incurred by individuals as 
members of a society. And “opting-out” systems that assume people would be willing to 
donate reflects a more communitarian outlook that respects the needs of the larger 
community as well as those of the individual. The communitarian view holds that 
individuals have a moral duty to help others when the cost to the individual of helping is 
very low. Since cadaveric organ donation can save the lives o f others and causes no 
significant harm to the decedent or the family, individuals who do not object on religious
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grounds have a moral duty to donate their organs, according to this viewpoint. The 
opting-out provision in a presumed consent system recognizes this moral duty by making 
consent to donation the norm — those opposed to donation would have the burden of 
making their objections known. The communitarian argument should be considered, for 
it directly challenges basic assumptions o f the current system -  that consent to donation 
should be considered an act of volunteerism as well as an issue of individual rights. 
Currently, the legal system sees the duty to help others as a moral duty properly left to the 
individual’s own conscience. While the communitarian viewpoint sounds interesting, 
and is worth considering, the overwhelming consensus of thought relating to organ 
donation remains grounded in the concept that control over the disposition of the dead 
should remain governed by individual and familial values rather than by a communitarian 
ethic.
The ethical advantage of required response is its undiluted loyalty to the value of 
individual autonomy. By giving the adult the opportunity to opt-out o f the donation 
system, required response respects the individual’s right to stand apart from society. On 
this dimension, required response is distinct from presumed consent because the latter 
offers less protection against the risk o f collecting organs from persons who hold 
reservations toward organ donation. This distinction held by required response is also the 
source of its major limitation, because it is uncertain what percentage of the adult 
population would elect to opt-out of the system. If not accompanied by an effective 
public education process, required response could backfire by empowering a potential 
bloc of anti-donation attitudes.
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In summary, the efficacy of required response would come about as the result of 
reducing uncertainty of the donor’s wishes by (1) recording the donor’s preferences 
routinely and (2) making those preferences available nationally to OPOs which have a 
need to know this information on a timely basis.
The policy of required response should be implemented as the first part of a 
largely reformed strateg}^ Over time, demographics (numbers, as Stone would put it) 
will likely force the legal system regulating organ donation to approach the policy of 
“presumed consent” and if my scenario is correct, implementing a required response 
system first can yield an exponential set of benefits (in terms of increased donations), as 
adults increasingly “opt-in” to the donation system by expressing “yes” as their required 
response. As required response evolves, favorable probabilities of the societal consensus 
on transplant donation will almost certainly emerge, as recorded through required 
response, so that in time, by custom, consent may be more safely “presumed” because of 
the (greater) universal approval of organ donation.
As discussed earlier, setting up an administration of required response systems, 
e.g. driver’s license notation, could actually be inexpensively implemented. Required 
response, furthermore, respects individual rights and autonomy, specifically allowing for 
individuals to “opt-out”, while building a much larger base of citizens who are directly 
expressing their willingness to donate. If nothing further happens, this system alone 
should reap great benefits for tens of thousands who are now waiting to die. If societal 
attitudes do change over time, “normalizing” the effects of presumed consent in tandem 
with required response, would dramatically impact the capabilities of the transplant
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community to not only save but provide a better quality of life for the thousands of 
people suffering from some form of end stage organ failure.
Notwithstanding the above arguments, the shortage crisis is now and reforms 
postponed until moralities change, means lives wasted and/or lost now. In the next 
chapter, I will examine policy reforms that are currently being considered. Their short­
term potential for pragmatic reform could have far reaching impacts on improving 
donation and procurement.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MARKET SOLUTIONS AND RECENT POLICY INITIATIVTES
Financial Incentives
The concept that financial incentives be offered as a potential solution to the 
ongoing organ donor shortage has been previously considered and debated among experts 
in the fields o f transplantation, ethics, law, and economics. The background for these 
proposals remains the ever-growing need for increased organ acquisition and the 
undeniable fact that the current system, despite thirty years of experience based on 
altruistic donation, has yet to meet this need. Historically, the current system of organ 
donation based on altruism, as discussed previously, evolved during the 1960s and 1970s 
when issues such as the definition of brain death, the use of donor cards, and public 
attitudes toward donation were conceptually immature. Based on the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) and the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), the 
buying and selling of organs has been specifically prohibited. In the late 1980s, required 
request legislation was adopted in all fifty states, but has yet to demonstrate a significant 
impact on the rate o f organ donation.
This chapter examines the use of financial incentives to encourage cadaveric 
organ donation. Proponents of financial incentives argue that incentives to donate would 
increase the supply o f organs and extend individuals’ control over their own bodies.
95
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Proposais involving financial incentives vary widely in their provisions for the 
use of living donors vs. cadaveric donors, the size and type of any financial incentive, the 
recommended degree of market regulation, and other areas. Some proposals favor an 
open, unregulated market governing the supply and distribution of organs. In an open 
market, those needing transplants would be able to buy organs directly from living donors 
or the families of cadaveric donors. The price would be determined by the law of supply 
and demand. Others have suggested using financial incentives to encourage donations 
while outlawing the outright purchase of organs by needy individuals. In this scheme, the 
supply of organs would increase but transplant recipients would continue to be selected 
according to ethically appropriate criteria related to medical need, not ability to pay.
Digressing, it is interesting to note that the 1984 NOTA was somewhat rushed 
into enactment as a result of an innovative financial incentive proposal. In 1983 an 
entrepreneurial physician named Jacobs invited 7,500 U.S. hospitals to participate in his 
plan to buy and sell kidneys through an international brokerage company. The uproar 
from this proposal — public as it was -  was so loud and immediate that Congress passed 
(by early 1984), the National Organ Transplant Act which further tightened UAGA and 
went on to prohibit the sale of human organs (including very stiff penalties for such 
activities). It is perhaps an interesting rhetorical question if one were to ask why it so 
often takes a moral outrage on the part of the public to get protective legislation passed 
and enacted. While our moral pulses were quickened by Dr. Jacobs’ business enterprise 
proposal — harvesting and brokering organs internationally for gain — the 1983-84 NOTA 
legislation also established the President’s Task Force on Organ Transplantation which 
was empowered to investigate the medical, legal, ethical, social, and not least the
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economic/financial implications of transplantation dynamics/ What is clear from the 
final passage and enactment of NOTA in 1984 is that the use o f financial incentives to 
encourage organ donation would require a major departure from the moral sense of 
American society as expressed in both federal and state law.
A definition of terms is necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial 
incentives or organ donation. First, financial incentives as discussed here, do not mean 
additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition in the 
counseling of prospective organ donor families. Because the concept of financial 
incentives fundamentally changes the process o f organ procurement, it has been argued 
that the term “donor” is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term 
such as “vendor.” Of latest practical significance is the distinction between “incentive” 
and “payment” since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if as 
interpreted by law, “incentives” do not amount to “purchases” and “donors” are therefore 
not transformed into “vendors.”
To many, the idea of any kind of incentive for donation is subject to serious 
ethical abuses. Many fear that financial incentives to donate would undermine altruism 
in society, be coercive to the poor, jeopardize the equality of the organ supply, and 
dehumanize society by viewing human beings and their parts as mere commodities.
All o f these concerns are important, but it is not clear that they justify a ban on all forms 
of financial incentives. It may be that the possible risks of certain kinds of incentives 
would be outweighed by the incentive’s effectiveness in increasing the organ supply and 
saving lives. In addition, many of the objections to a market for organs do not apply 
equally to all forms of financial incentives - some types of incentives could be effective
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and relatively free of moral risk. As Childress writes, “it may be possible to 
accommodate some types of transfer of some kinds of tissues for valuable consideration 
without major ethical costs.”" Some financial incentives, such as future contracts for 
cadaver donors, may be effective in saving lives while avoiding the ethical pitfalls of 
other forms of incentives.
Incentive Alternatives
Perhaps the most promising form o f financial incentive for organ donation is a 
modest payment for cadaveric donation at the time the organs are retrieved. In this type 
of plan, an adult could agree while still competent to donate his or her organs after death 
in return, a state agency, an insurance company or other third party would agree to some 
financial remuneration to the donor’s family, estate, or beneficiary at the time of actual 
donation. Thus, under such an agreement, called a future contract, the financial benefit 
from donation would go to the family after the donor’s death, when organs are retrieved. 
However, the decision to donate would have been made by the competent donor while 
still living. Decisions to accept financial incentives would not be made by the decedent’s 
family or other third party.
Several incentive proposals have evolved since the late 1980s and early 1990s.
One of the earliest proposals actually allowed living individuals to contract for future 
delivery of their organs and yet receive compensation before death. This concept was 
originally put forward by Richard Schwindt and Aidan Vining in 1986 who suggested 
that a “public purchase market with forward delivery” be established and operated by the 
federal government. In this proposal, a government buyer/broker would execute a
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“contingent-forward” contract (like a commodity market futures contract) with an 
individual for the delivery of organs upon death. In Schwindt and Vining’s proposal a 
pure market price would not exist, rather the government would adjust the price based 
upon fluctuating organ inventory requirements and of course, demand.^
This type of an arrangement is called a monopsony -  a situation which is the 
opposite of a monopoly, where there is one seller. A monopsony environment has only 
one buyer. There are a number of purely practical and problematic issues with Schwindt 
and Vining’s proposal. From a practical standpoint, efficiency would be a large problem. 
For example, not everyone who might engage in a “futures” contract would be able to 
deliver his organs upon death. Some would die with organs unsuitable for transplantation 
(for a variety of reasons), others would die under circumstances where it simply became 
logistically impossible to recover the organs previously contracted and paid for.
Therefore it is highly likely that a relatively large proportion of paid for organs would not 
be recovered.
From an economic standpoint, the monopsony situation represents unique 
problems for the buyer (in this case, likely the government). The problem arises in the 
need to very accurately predict demand requirements for the future organs. Further, these 
commodities are without question the most perishable goods on the planet. As such, 
there is no such thing as inventory. Another issue facing the monopsonist is analogous 
also to the “futures” market. Once contracted for, (like com, soybeans or cattle), the 
organs will be deliverable in the future. The sole buyer in the future likely will be 
dealing with improvements in medical/surgical procedures, better preventative medicine
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protocols, and even the likely development of artificial organs. All o f the above would 
impact the need for delivery o f organs contracted for in the past.
A second proposal featuring a financial incentive for donation was developed in 
1990 by Henry Hansmann. His proposal was actually a variation on the Schwindt-Vining 
system discussed above. This proposal also involved the type of a futures contract 
purchased from a potential donor while he was still alive. However, the Hansmann 
variation was not a lifetime contract, rather it was renewable and renegotiable on an 
annual basis. Hansmann also suggested that this contract could be managed by health 
insurance companies rather than the government, and that the insurance companies would 
compensate the donors by reducing insurance premiums."* This proposal suffers some of 
the same practical problems as above, while offering a few new benefits. Practically, the 
problem of death occurring and organ suitability remains the same as under the 
Schwindt-Vining proposal. On the cost side, however, the aggregate financial exposure 
fi"om the buyer (in this case, likely, insurance companies), could be controlled more 
efficiently. Hansmann’s proposal suggested that pricing for the future organ donations 
could be set and established by the market or by government edict. Hansmann’s proposal 
raises significant moral questions, if not outright problems. If prices were established by 
free market actions, any spot shortages would obviously have the impact of bidding 
prices up, depending of course, on the absolute parameters of the negotiated price 
elements of the future contract. If  the prices were set by the government, they would 
most likely be lower than any market price, possibly however, forcing a situation where 
the incentive did not propel enough potential donors to make the donation decision. This 
method runs the typical market risks of high prices eliminating some potential recipients
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who need the organ but cannot afford them, contrasted with the opposite circumstances 
with the incentive not being high enough to induce enough donors to contribute. A 
further problem with the Hansmann proposal involves the high level of transaction costs 
that would, of necessity, be allocated to this method. For instance, significant monitoring 
of future donors would probably be necessary to ensure that they did not resell (for an 
additional payment) their organs to other procurement agencies. The Schwindt-Vining 
proposal also suffers from this weakness. In addition, neither proposal has actually 
accounted for the airline ticket sales analogy -  that is, as airlines routinely overbook on 
the probability that not everyone booked or sold a ticket will actually show up for the 
flight, transplant procurement agencies (due to the variables involved in matching 
antigens) must of necessity buy/contract for higher numbers of donor organs than they 
will actually need in the future.
A third futures market plan has been proposed by Lloyd Cohen. This plan 
probably achieves greater efficiency because it avoids many unnecessary costs. The 
Cohen plan compensates the estate or the beneficiary rather than (in advance) the 
potential donors, and only for the organs actually recovered at death.^ Although 
appearing efficient in terms of cost, it might still be ultimately inefficient in that it relies 
on a traditional altruistic motive on the part of the donor since he/she won’t be getting a 
compensation benefit. Given that altruistic foundation, these are concerns that aggregate 
donor procurement would still be subject to altruistic motives and that donor gifting may 
or may not be statistically improved.
A fourth incentive plan is one authored by Thomas Peters. Peters does not 
consider a futures market, rather he suggested making outright payments to survivors
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only if  the recovered organs will be useful and actually recovered at death. This method 
could project large cost savings into its narrow focus and not having to pay in advance for 
something that might not be useful or never actually delivered.^
Arguments in Favor of Future Contracts
Arguments in favor of financial incentives/future contracts for organ donation are 
grounded in the hope that such a system would increase the supply of organs and thereby 
secure the basic ethical concern of saving lives that would otherwise be lost due to a lack 
of this resource. The fact that the current altruistic system of donation has been in place 
for thirty years without modification or change despite the different organs now available 
(heart, liver, lung, pancreas) and the increased transplant activity today, has been cited as 
justification to consider a new approach. Specifically, because the current organ 
procurement system is based on financial gain for all concerned (physicians, surgeons, 
coordinators, social workers, hospitals, etc.), the altruistic “gift” upon which so many 
recipients depend has been described as unfair and insensitive to donor families and the 
source of basic distrust of the system by the public. It has been argued that the donor and 
the family are the only participants not directly benefiting from the process and therefore, 
some form of compensation is the right thing to do, even if the number of donors and 
cadaveric organs does not appreciably increase.
One point in favor of future contracts is that they address all of the usual factors 
involved in organ donation: the individual donor, the family, and the physicians and 
hospital personnel involved. Future contracts could overcome the psychological costs of 
agreeing to donate, reduce the need for bedside requests to grieving families to consent to
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the harvesting of their loved one’s organs, enhance donor autonomy, and meet the 
requirements of justice. Each of these advantages is discussed in some detail below.
Overcoming Psychological Costs of Organ Donation 
As discussed previously, many supporters of organ donation do not sign donor 
cards because of their reluctance to consider their own mortality and the idea of being 
operated on after death. Although the adoption of required response, in which 
individuals would be required to make a decision regarding donation, might help address 
this issue, it in itself would provide no motivation to respond affirmatively. For 
individuals who favor organ donation but are uneasy or reluctant about identifying 
themselves as donors, an additional incentive may be all it takes to convince them to 
donate.
The success of a system of future contracts in encouraging an individual to face 
the donation decision and make an affirmative choice has been described as related to the 
length of the individual’s reluctance to consider issues related to his own mortality. 
Although individuals will vary in their feelings in this area, there is reason to believe that 
this reluctance is generally not very deep. For instance, in a 1993 Gallup Poll, 85% of 
respondents supported the donation of organs for transplantation, and 69% of respondents 
indicated that they are likely to want to donate their own organs after death. At the same 
time, only 42% of respondents indicated that they have made a personal decision about 
donating their own organs.^ Limited financial incentives could be successful in many 
cases in translating this general support into a greater individual commitment to donate 
organs after death.
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Easing Pressure on Physicians and Families o f Cadaveric Organ Donors 
In most cases, potential organ donors have not made their preferences regarding 
donation clear before death. The passage of required request laws to obtain the donor ‘s 
and/or family’s permission for donation has created a stressful situation for physicians 
and other hospital personnel, who must make the requests, and for families who may 
resent having to make such a decision in the midst o f their grief.
Future contracts for cadaveric donation can ease this situation by encouraging 
individuals to become donors and to discuss their decision with their families, who would 
usually be the designated beneficiaries of future contracts. Future contracts, therefore, 
would benefit families primarily removing the need that often arises under the current 
regime of required request for families to make a decision regarding donation during their 
time o f grief. When the deceased had already entered into a future contract, the family 
would either already know or be made aware by the public nature of the contract system 
-  thus the need for family permission would not arise. Future contracts can help ease the 
pressure on families and physicians created by required request laws.
Enhancement of Donor Autonomy 
Future contracts can help ensure that individuals control whether their organs are 
used for transplantation. Under generally accepted principles of personal autonomy, 
patients have the right to decide what happens to their bodies. Individual autonomy also 
reflects our society’s traditional respect for the unique worth of the individual. We 
acknowledge and respect human dignity when we grant individuals the freedom to make 
choices in accordance with their own values. It is important for individuals to control not
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only what happens to them in the present but also to direct their future course in life and 
after death. The individual’s interest in controlling the disposition of his or her own body 
and property after death suggest that it is ethically preferable for the individual, rather 
than the family, to make the decision to donate organs. This view is prevalent in the law 
as well. Under UAGA, the individual has the right to decide to donate organs after death.
As mentioned previously, despite the legal and ethical arguments in favor of 
obtaining consent for donation directly from the prospective donor, in advance of illness 
or injury, the current system relies heavily on permission from the next-of-kin at the time 
of the prospective donor’s death. Notwithstanding any pre-consent, physicians generally 
require permission from the decedent’s family before proceeding with organ retrieval. 
There is no guarantee, however, that the families will conform with the actual (although 
possibly unexpressed) wishes of the donor. Furthermore, when the deceased had 
expressed a desire to donate organs, requiring further approval from the family gives the 
family the ability to effectively veto the donor’s decision.
Future contracts, by encouraging individuals to identify themselves as organ 
donors, would promote individual autonomy and lessen the possibility of a family veto. 
Thus, by encouraging the individual to make his or her desire to donate known in 
advance (via a future contract), it becomes more difficult to oppose or ignore the 
individual’s wishes, a future contract transfers decision-making power from the family 
back to the individual donor.
It might be argued that deference to the decedent’s wishes over possible 
objections from the family may cause psychological harm to the family, increase the 
physician’s risk of liability, or foster a negative perception among the public of over-
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zealous physicians who seize organs without family permission. These objections, 
however, have little validation. As discussed above, the ethical justification of respecting 
the donor’s decision is firmly grounded in the principle of autonomy.
Respecting the wishes o f the donor is not incompatible with the view that the 
family has a legitimate interest in the care of their loved one’s body. Although the family 
generally has the right to make decisions for a family member who lacks decision­
making capacity, the family’s ethical obligation is to act as the executor of the patient’s 
wishes and to make decisions in accordance with what the patient would have wanted, 
not according to their own values.
Recognizing the major role played by the family under the current organ donation 
system, some advocate offering financial incentives directly to families of decedents 
rather than to individuals in advance of death.* While such an approach might be 
effective in encouraging families to donate the organs of their loved ones, it misses the 
point and is ethically problematic. Allowing the family to decide to donate in return for 
payment clearly emphasizes the family’s decision-making power over the preferences of 
the individual, serving as the source of the organs, thereby suggesting that the family has 
proprietary rights over the relative’s body. Futures contracts, in contrast, would 
encourage individuals to make the donation decision early and by themselves and would 
increase the likelihood that those decisions would be respected.
Justice
Advocates of future contracts and other financial incentives point out that under 
the current system, the donor is the only party involved in transplantation who does not
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benefit from the procedure. The recipients of donated organs clearly benefit the most of 
all the parties involved, and transplant teams are well paid for their services. It seems 
unfair that the donor, who makes the whole process possible, is the only one who is not 
financially rewarded, and yet is expected to act out of altruism alone. I think it can be 
argued, therefore, that justice requires that financial remuneration for the donor or the 
donor’s family be allowed to reward the party most responsible for the transplant 
procedure.
Objections to Financial Incentives
Any course of action that would entail providing financial compensation to organ
donors or their family for the donation of organs for transplant purposes must first
confront current federal laws making it a felony to buy or sell human organs for the
purpose of transplantation. Since passage of the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
(NOTA), federal law has provided that:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise 
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation if the transplant affects interstate commerce.”
As discussed, there have been several different proposals for using financial
incentives to increase organ donation. To understand how Congress might react to such
approaches -  whether as a pilot program or otherwise -  one has to understand the federal
prohibition’s origins.
While some have said this prohibition was adopted without serious consideration
by Congress (see the discussion regarding Dr. Jacobs, who in 1983 proposed the
establishment o f an international brokerage exchange for organs for transplant), the
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legislative history of this provision reveals four basic concerns underlying the enactment 
of this section of NOTA: (1) a concern that a system o f organ procurement based upon 
organ sales would destroy the existing system o f voluntary donation; (2) concern that 
indigents and “Third World” individuals would become the vast majority of the donor 
pool; (3) concern for safeguarding the health of living donors; and (4) concem that a 
payment-based procurement system would increase the likelihood of transmitting disease 
in transplanted organs. As discussed in the earlier mention of Dr. Jacobs and his organ 
sales scheme, the national outrage that his proposal evoked, undeniably galvanized moral 
conservatives into an intense lobbying of Congress which then rushed to legislate NOTA.
Although the debate on using financial incentives to increase organ donation is 
not new, it has taken on new life recently as waiting lists have lengthened and deaths 
while waiting have increased. Congress, however, has not spoken to this issue since the 
initial passage (in 1984) of the prohibition. Obviously, the appropriate time for it to do so 
would be during the reauthorization of NOTA, which is supposed to occur every three 
years. However, as will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter Five, Congress 
has not formally re-authorized NOTA since 1990. It is not only the ethical questions that 
have begun to pile up over the succeeding nine years since the last reauthorization, but 
dozens o f medical, surgical, technical, and pharmacological advancements have Congress 
quite far behind the curve. Given all of those listed advancements, and their (in some 
cases) correlated ethical dilemmas, it is clear that Congress has virtually abdicated its 
social responsibility in terms o f organ transplantation issues.
Notwithstanding legal and policy issues that currently stand in the way of any 
consensus approval o f financial incentives for organ donors, there are a number of ethical
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pitfalls facing proposals involving the use of financial incentives. In general: (1) the 
dilution of altruism in society; (2) the risk that the quality of donated organs would 
decrease; (3) doubts about the volunteerism of those who accept financial incentives for 
donation; and (4) the treatment o f human beings and their parts as commodities.
Diluting Altruism
Under the existing organ procurement system, the only motivation for donating 
one’s organs is altmism. Many commentators identify altruism as an important end in 
itself worthy of protection from encroachment.^ Financial incentives, it is argued would 
spell the end of altruistic gift giving and add to the fragmentation of society.
Although it is indisputably an important social virtue, society’s interest in the 
ethic of altruism must be weighed against the pressing claims of individuals to life itself. 
However, altruism in society is not expressed exclusively through organ donation.
Quality Concerns of Donated Organs
Some fears have been expressed that financial incentives could encourage 
individuals to donate organs even if they are of questionable quality. The closest analogy 
that is drawn has to do with the practice of selling blood. Evidence suggests that paying 
blood donors may actually decrease the overall quality of the blood supply because it 
encourages prospective donors to conceal disease, drug use, or other factors that would 
make their blood medically unacceptable. In recent years, routine donor and laboratory 
screening tests have largely eliminated quality differences in blood plasma fi'om unpaid 
vs. paid donors (Strauss et. al. 1994).
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While inferior quality may still be a concem with paid blood donation, it is much 
less likely to be a problem with organ donation under a system of future contracts.
Unlike paid blood donors who might conceal risk factors because of the prospect of 
receiving quick cash for donation, organ donors who may have entered into future 
contracts are dead and incapable of such deception. While it is conceivable that the 
family o f the deceased might withhold relevant information about their relative’s health 
history or risk factors to collect the modest payment from the future contract, the chances 
that a family would behave in such a manner in the midst of their grief and the further 
chances that laboratory tests and physical inspection o f the organ would fail to identify a 
defect in the organ are very slight.
Incentives could even enhance the quality of the organ supply if payments were 
made only after the organs had been judged medically suitable. Payers (government 
agencies) of incentives would have a strong interest in making certain donated organs 
were in good shape before payment was made.
Summarizing, quality concerns most likely can be avoided with appropriate 
regulations concerning the use of the incentives. Quality concerns do arise with other 
forms of financial incentives. For instance, an open market for organs from living donors 
could result in a large number of private, unregulated exchanges of organs for dollars. 
Quality control in such a scenario would be extremely questionable.
Volunteering
Financial incentives could be unduly influential on the poor, who because of their 
dire financial need could be induced/coerced into making undesirable choices. Further,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
financial incentives that result in the poor becoming the majority of organ donors and the 
rich the majority of recipients would seriously undermine our society’s egalitarian ideals. 
(Pellegrino, 1991; Dougherty, 1987). Although, this is a formidable problem for 
proposals offering financial incentives to living donors, it is much less of a problem for 
future contracts for cadaveric donors.
When discussing voluntarism, concerns rise regarding paternalism. Proponents of 
incentives argue that the poor are already disadvantaged in our society and have few 
options for raising their standard of living. Further, it would be unjust to deny the poor 
one of the few options that they do have — accepting money for organ donation -  mainly 
because others (usually in more comfortable positions) feel uneasy about it. The 
paternalism argument is probably defeated again in the area o f risks undertaken. For 
living donors, although significant, risks are probably not as great as those attending 
other situations for which payment is expected and appropriate, such as employment in 
the military or police force. If society is willing to pay people to accept the risks of 
hazardous jobs, then it should tolerate payment for accepting the risks of organ donation.
Notwithstanding minimized (in the United States) concerns regarding exploitation 
and coercion of the poor, there is still a strong possibility that the poor could be made 
even more vulnerable by the pressure to donate created by incentives. This concem is 
one of the most convincing arguments for continuing to prohibit the offering of financial 
incentives to living donors. However, the potential for exploitation of the poor is greatly 
minimized if financial incentives are limited to future contracts for cadaveric donors 
only.
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Human Beings As Commodities 
This objection to financial incentives holds that organs and perhaps human body 
parts in general, are simply not the kinds of things that should be bought or sold. This 
observer believes that offering financial incentives would in effect make organ donation 
just another economic activity. Thus, it is argued, it would “cheapen the gift of life and 
fundamentally alter the social meaning of organ donation altogether.”**
Although there is no consensus on the exact nature o f an individual’s property 
interest in his or her own body, it is true that our attitudes toward donated organs are 
substantially different from our attitudes toward traditional goods on the market. The 
system of future contracts could be carefully designed and regulated to minimize 
commercialization of the donation process. Nevertheless, it seems likely to always be 
argued by some that any introduction of incentives for donation inappropriately treats the 
body as a commodity, even if the incentive falls short of creating full property rights in 
one’s own body. This view, however, appears to overlook that some “donor-ship” rights 
in the body are already a part of society’s legal and ethical traditions. Donation itself 
depends on some notion of ownership rights, that presumably one cannot give away what 
one does not own anymore than one can sell it. The important question is not which 
account of property or ownership rights in the body is more convincing, but whether 
financial incentives can be designed to encourage donation while protecting donors from 
exploitation.
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Would A Market Approach Work?
A properly designed and regulated system of future contracts could avoid the 
ethical pitfalls attributed to the use of financial incentives. The system that financial 
incentives (i.e., the market) would replace or supplement is the current system based 
almost solely on altruism. How do altruism and markets compare in other contexts as 
devices to induce people to provide for strangers? A transplant organ is for its recipient a 
necessity of life. In the case of necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter, we permit 
markets to operate side-by-side with altruism. If  this were not so, life would be vastly 
different than it is today, for all but a trivial quantity of necessities comes to us by way 
market actions rather than by gift. If with respect to the very essentials of life, self- 
interest dominates altruism as a motive for people to provide for strangers, what reason is 
there to believe that the motivations to donate cadaveric organs are any different?
Perhaps because unlike those other necessities, which require much effort and sacrifice to 
produce and supply, cadaveric donation requires no sacrifice. The dead gain nothing by 
retaining their organs, and therefore sacrifice nothing by supplying them. Markets are 
most effective at transferring goods from low valued uses to high valued uses. I can 
think of no good that fits this bill better than a cadaveric organ. But if the organ is of no 
value to the dead, then why does altmism not work? Perhaps the organ does have a value 
(spiritual, psychological, or otherwise). Could it be that the value is so great that those 
who refuse consent are simply irrevocably opposed to donation? That seems highly 
unlikely. Polling data over the last thirty years continue to repeat and reaffirm that next- 
of-kin can often be persuaded to donate. Further, the many signed organ donor cards, the
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absence o f any movement protesting cadaveric organ donation, all strongly suggest that 
there is no widespread deeply felt objection to donation.
So again, why are we not getting more organs? In Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three I elaborated on the many reasons; fear of over-eager doctors; aesthetic, cultural, 
and religious concerns; and an unwillingness to confront one’s own mortality (among 
many others).
No one would argue that there has not been a lot of effort expended in an attempt 
to discover the root o f people’s reluctance to donate. I submit that much of this effort 
misconceives the problem and obscures it with too much detail. Although social, 
religious, medical, and psychological issues are all at play, the uneasiness about organ 
donation does not operationally distinguish it from a host of other activities in which 
people engage despite deep-seated antipathy. From a different view than much of the 
existing literature, the objections reported by thirty years of public polling are costs that 
prospective donors must incur. They are and have been unwilling to donate because they 
are being asked to assume those costs without being offered a sufficient compensating 
benefit.
A successful futures market requires that the supply of cadaveric organs be like 
the supply o f almost all other goods and respond to price. What evidence is there on the 
shape of the organ donors supply curve? At present we know but one point on the curve. 
The price currently paid to organ donors is $0. At that price we have a substantial but 
less than satisfactory amount of organ donation. Imagine that we do not raise the price, 
but lower it instead. Would anyone doubt that if donors were charged a fee o f  for 
example, $500 for donating that the currently supply would dry up? If on one side of the
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$0 price the supply curve is highly responsive to price, is there any reason to think that on 
the other side of the SO price supply is totally unresponsive?
Although an open, unregulated market for organs would be potentially 
exploitative and degrading, some form of financial incentive to encourage the donation of 
organs may be ethically permissible. A number of non-flnancial strategies to encourage 
donation have been pursued aggressively for many years, with only limited success (e.g. 
Public Service Announcements, and on-going yet sporadic educational programs). A 
carefully designed and regulated program of future contracts in cadaver organs could 
significantly increase the supply o f organs and for some organs save many more lives, 
while avoiding the ethical pitfalls associated with other forms of financial incentives.
The actual effectiveness of future contracts in increasing the supply o f organs is, 
like all untried policies, difficult to predict. A great deal would depend on public reaction 
to the issue. Recent polling evidence suggests that some large sectors of the public and 
physicians still feel uncomfortable with the idea of financial incentives for donation. For 
instance, in a recent Gallup Poll, only 12% of respondents said they would be more likely 
to donate their own or a family member’s organs if financial incentives were offered,
81% said financial incentives would have no effect, and 5% said financial incentives 
would make them less likely to donate.
It is clear that a system o f future contracts, though ethically acceptable, raises a 
number o f practical issues regarding its feasibility. Since the empirical effectiveness of 
incentives cannot be settled in advance, some limited experimentation with future 
contracts or other incentive may be appropriate. Of course, toward this end, the existing
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legal prohibition against the use o f financial incentives would have to be lifted, at least 
temporarily, to allow for such experimentation/pilot programs to take place.
An Ethical Compromise
Opponents of financial incentives point out that there would be potentially 
decreased emotional gain for the donor family, decreased respect for life and the sanctity 
of the human body and a loss o f the personal link that currently exists in the donation 
process. Great concern has been expressed theoretically regarding a potential rich vs. 
poor phenomenon and the fact that financial need should not be linked in a coercive way 
to giving consent for organ procurement. Ironically, such incentives directed primarily at 
the Black community would undoubtedly recall for many the past experience of 
'‘commerce and bodies” that is unfortunately a part of our country’s history.
Beyond theoretical concerns, those opposed to financial incentives predict a 
tremendous increase in administrative requirements and therefore cost. Such money 
would be better spent on more education for the public and medical communities 
regarding the need for organ donation via the current altruistic system and the benefit to 
society as a whole through this process.
Beyond the fact that proposed financial incentives may actually prove to be 
disincentives to potential donors, it has been argued that financial gain by the donor 
family does not address the problem that many potential donor families are simply never 
asked. This failure by the medical community to participate in the donation process 
should not be addressed by incentives directed at the potential donor alone.
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The current organ donor procurement policies, essentially in effect during the 
entire span of transplantation technology, has resulted in an ever-widening gap between 
demand and supply. Indeed, demand far outstrips supply. Yet persons who never would 
have considered being donors, bitterly complain when in need and no organ is available 
for them or their loved ones. In 1999 we have arrived at this untenable position by 
divorcing responsibility and obligation from rights. But can we grant such rights without 
also ascribing the correlating obligation and responsibility? If you feel that you have a 
right to an organ, should you need one, do you not have a duty to be prepared to donate 
yours should you no longer be in need of it while another is?
The concept outlined above, would function with relatively equivalent 
probabilities like an inexpensive insurance policy. For a potential donor, expressing a 
willingness to donate in the present would yield the potential payoff of a preferred status 
should the potential donor ever need an organ him or herself in the future. Should some 
unfortunate set of circumstances arise causing a end-stage organ failure, the enrolled 
preferred status donor would receive the equivalent of an insurance payoff by moving to 
the top of any waiting list for a particular organ that was necessary for his or her survival. 
Should the willing donor never suffer from end-stage organ disease, he would die 
knowing that altruistically he had affirmatively registered his desire to become a donor. 
This particular method would remove the ideal o f family veto from the equation. All 
involved would know beforehand of the expressed wishes of the decedent. Again, the 
benefit is analogous to an inexpensive insurance contract. By agreeing to be a donor any 
time that death occurred, he would receive an incentive in the form of a preferred status 
should he at some point in the future require an organ himself.
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At least two ethical issues are important in considering preferred status. If 
preferred status were initiated, what would be the balance between the ethical good and 
bad? And, as an independent utilitarian ethical issue, what would be the impact on the 
system? In other words, is it necessary to consider both whether the process is 
intrinsically justified ethically and whether it would actually help or harm organ 
donation?
The impact on the system would depend strongly on the perception of society and 
the transplant community as to the ethical worth of preferred status and this would 
involve mainly the degree to which the process was deemed to be fair. A net ethical good 
from this point o f view would accrue from an increased perception that organ donation is 
important to all, transplants are successful, and the system works without barriers to the 
disadvantaged segments of society.
The net ethical worth of preferred status is partly an issue of justice. Is it fair for 
an individual who is willing to participate in the system of transplantation to not receive 
an organ while another medically similar individual who was unwilling to participate 
receives a transplant? On the other hand, it may be framed in terms of autonomy.
Intrinsic to the altruistic approach to organ donation is the autonomy of each person to 
decide.
Because the life-giving organ represents a benefit that transcends money, its value 
is the same to a very poor disadvantaged person as to a wealthy one, unlike a monetary 
consideration. It would be hoped that the disadvantaged, now particularly likely to view 
organ donation and transplantation with suspicion, might realize a sense of democracy in 
their rightful access to the same option as any other citizen. This could be particularly
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important in the case of minorities -  and especially for Blacks, who have a particular 
need in view of their higher incidence of kidney failure. It would encourage donation by 
this segment of the population that is particularly likely to also need the availability of a 
transplant.
Some possibilities by which preferred status might produce harm are derived from 
negative speculations on its potential for good. A primary objection is that there are two 
sides to the issue o f fairness. Consider the scenario of two medically similar patients, for 
whom preferred status would be the tiebreaker. The other patient has lived an exemplary 
life, has contributed financially and personally to medical causes including 
transplantation, and therefore has directly benefited many other people but has not felt 
comfortable agreeing to organ donation. Is there justice in the former person receiving 
the organ, allowing that one arbitrary fact of opting in to the system to override all the 
other comparative points, which would tilt the choice toward the latter? In fact, opting in 
is not considered a determinant o f moral worth, but rather a social contract, again, as 
mentioned above, a sort of insurance that everyone has a right to, if  they wish to make the 
commitment. However, it would be pointless to argue that there’s not a measure of worth 
connected to the concept of preferred status. If only one factor, preferred status, were to 
be instituted, might that start the altruistic system down a slippery slope of increasing 
calculations of worth that have so far been avoided?
Advantages of preferred status over other approaches toward incentivizing organ 
donation include intrinsic fairness with regard to “opting in,” the fact that special 
priceless organ does not represent financial payment, and that it would be equitable 
across all strata of society.
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In Chapter Five, which follows. I’ll examine the current policies, which regulate 
transplantation in the United States. The only existing law on the statutes is the 1984 
NOTA, which contained a “sunset” clause calling for its expiration every three years. 
NOTA was re-authorized in 1987 and in 1990. Congress, however, has not re-authorized 
NOTA since 1990. Throughout the decade o f the 1990’s, there have been many 
significant advances in the fields of medicine, surgery, technology, and pharmacological 
therapies -  in general, and quite specifically in the field of transplantation. Nevertheless, 
Congress has abdicated its responsibility, and as a result finds itself behind the curve in 
areas such as research and development, medical science, and especially ethical 
interpretations of the various innovations and improvements to the field. In early 1998, 
the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, attempting to fill the vacuum 
created by Congress, issued new sets of regulations affecting the transplantation universe. 
The preceding nine years, law and regulations have fallen very far behind the current 
state o f the art. Most of the recommendations and the new regulations proposed by HHS, 
were targeted at clarifying/remedying issues that everyone within the transplant 
community agreed needed to be addressed. However, several major issues relating to the 
donation, recipient selection, national allocation, and equity created something of a 
firestorm during the summer of 1998 when both houses of the U. S. Congress held 
hearings. Nothing was resolved during the course of the House and Senate Hearings on 
the HHS proposed regulations, but, both Houses voted in committee, to table the issuance 
of the regulations for one year. In Chapter Five we will examine the proposed new 
policies that had the potential for dramatically changing the transplantation world as it is 
evolved at the end of the Twentieth Century.
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CEEAPTER FI\Œ
CURRENT POLICIES 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the preceding chapters I have established the environment in which the medical 
specialty and practice of organ transplantation has evolved and developed during the last 
thirty-plus years. Although contemplated by mankind and medicine for centuries, 
transplantation truly has only been successfully performed since the early 1960s. In the 
early days of experimentation, and indeed even as the first living donor transplants were 
being performed, there was a great outcry amongst nearly all segments of the population 
regarding the ethical parameters within which organs were being procured and distributed 
to end-stage organ failure patients. The hypothesis herein is that the legal and moral 
legitimacy established in the beginning for organ procurement has always been based on 
altruistic volunteerism. However, within the first chapter, I made the claim that altruism 
has failed. It has failed in any sense of pragmatic measurement of being an efficient or 
efficacious method of procuring organs for transplantation. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, annually, a relatively constant number o f individuals have actually benefitted 
from receiving an organ from a donor. The number of successful transplants has hovered 
at approximately 20,000 successful procedures performed over a span of the preceding 
five years. Notwithstanding, the advancements in surgical techniques, new
124
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technologies, and the development o f new immuno-suppressive drug therapies, the list of 
those waiting is approximately 60,000 and growing at a rate of approximately 500 new 
patients a month. Clearly, the supply o f medically suitable donor organs has not kept up 
with the ever-increasing demand for this life-saving or life-enhancing scarce resource.
In Chapter One, I made a brief historical reference as to the efficiency, ethicacy, 
and legitimacy of the two existing United States laws governing and regulating 
transplantation. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 (ratified by all fifty states by 
1973), and the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA enacted in 1984), remain the only 
two national policies relating to organ transplantation. As we near the close o f the 
Twentieth Century, a vacuum in terms of direction and policy clearly exists at the 
national, as well as the local policy level.
In Chapter Five, I will be examining in greater detail the impacts upon organ 
donation of U AG A and NOTA, as well as, analyzing new policies that were first 
proposed in April of 1998. Following the critical assessment of the proposed new 
regulations, I will summarize my conclusions drawn from the analysis o f the first four 
chapters, and make specific policy recommendations that can achieve a balance between 
efficiency and legitimacy on the one hand, and ethics and morality on the other.
Historical Transplant Policy Perspective
In 1984, NOTA envisioned a national transplant system operated by medical and 
healthcare professionals that would ensure an equitable allocation system serving the 
public’ s interest with oversight by the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). The act created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
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(OPTN). a nonprofit private sector network to be operated by a contractor approved by 
HHS.* (See Appendix A, Table 5). Originally, OPTN membership and policies were 
voluntary. But with enactment of the 1986 Budget Reconciliation Act, all hospitals that 
perform transplants and all organ procurement organizations (OPO’s) were required to 
abide by the rules and requirements of the OPTN in order to receive Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursements. In December 1989, HHS issued a Federal Register notice 
indicating that all OPTN rules and requirements remain voluntary until the Secretary 
issued regulations to define the rules and policy-making procedures of the OPTN and 
HHS. However, a Notice of Proposed Rule making was not published until September of 
1994, a lapse of nearly five years.
After two extensive comments periods and three days of special hearings, HHS 
announced a Final Rule aimed at providing the framework for the operation of the OPTN, 
and assurance that the nation's organ procurement and transplantation system operates 
for the greatest benefit of transplant patients. The regulation builds on medical 
technology advancements which can be adapted to accommodate future enhancements, 
directs the medical community to provide leadership in transplant development, sets 
procedures for involvement by patients, donors, and their families, and sets goals for the 
fair and effective use of donated organs. The 1996 announcement carried a two-year 
“buffer period” prior to becoming effective.
On April 2, 1998, Secretary Shalala published HHS’ notice in the Federal 
Register announcing the implementation of the “Final Rule” 90 days hence (including a 
last 60-day comment period). The Rule provides the framework within which the OPTN, 
its members and all other participants in organ procurement and transplantation will
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operate. The Rule sets the requirements for the structure of and membership in the 
OPTN, the OPTN policy-making process -  including the Secretary’s oversight; 
standardized criteria for placing candidates on a national waiting list; equitable organ 
procurement and allocation; evaluation of OPTN activities; and record maintenance and 
reporting by the OPTN, OPO’s and all transplant hospitals.
Unfortunately, the topic of altruism in organ donation is only discussed 
peripherally or tangentially within HHS’ 1998 proposed Final Rule. The issues described 
herein, relating to incentives to improve the organ donor rate, are not discussed directly at 
all within the proposed HHS regulation. Indeed, the majority of the subjects covered in 
the Final Rule relate to the equitable allocation and distribution of organs -  however 
many come into the distribution system. The Final Rule does not specifically approach 
the complex issues of procurement, whether they are related to altruism or to an 
incentive-based encouragement system. In other words, the 1998 proposed regulation 
essentially sets forth regulations and parameters for the recipient’s side of the 
transplantation equation. Granted, there are numerous inefficiencies and inequities that 
infect the recipient/distribution side. However, many if not most of the recipients’ 
problems -  administrative, medical, legal, ethical, and several other practical/pragmatic 
categories -  would not even exist if Congress and/or HHS had first worked on the 
donation side of the equation. The resultant state of affairs is that, HHS, acting in the 
near total vacuum of Congress’ nine years of healthcare legislation inactivity, effectively 
put the cart in front of the horse. This is not totally surprising, however, in that recipient 
side issues mostly relating to allocation/distributional aspects are more heavily weighted 
in the day-to-day administration of actually performing transplants. No one denies that
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there are a myriad of ethical issues relating to recipient selection; rather it is that if the 
supply problems were eliminated or at the minimum greatly reduced, many of the ethical 
problems affecting recipient selection would cease to exist.
Therefore, in a chapter that should be devoted to analysis of current policies and 
integration of same with the ethical and moral issues that are the elements of my 
hypotheses, I arrive at something of a cul de sac. There are policies that are contained 
within the 1984 NOTA, and although they exist, they are not efficient, current or 
legitimate. 1984 NOTA policies are several orders of magnitude behind the 
advancements in medical and surgical techniques and procedures, pharmacological drug 
therapies and their applications, that are today’s scientific realities. Pragmatically,
NOTA policies in many cases, are even further orders of magnitude behind actual day-to- 
day operational realities.
1998 HHS Final Rule Impacts on Organ Donation 
There has been at least one potential organ donation impact resulting from the 
proposed Final Rule. That impact on donation is related to and bound together with 
several very complex variables affecting organ allocation and distribution. One of the 
key goals of the HHS Final Rule, indeed, the main goal, is to “improve the equity of the 
nation’s transplant system.”'  Equity, in this context means that as far as medically 
feasible, there should be a “level playing field” in organ allocations. Organs should be 
allocated based on patients’ medical need and sound medical judgment, with less 
emphasis on keeping organs in the local area where they are procured. Patients should 
have an equal chance to receive an organ based on their medical need, not the accident of
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geography. Efforts should be made to equalize waiting time among different regions of 
the country. Those goals, as stated by HHS in April 1998, when spelled out in detail 
would have wide-ranging impacts on not only donors but also potential recipients. The 
idea behind this proposal is that HHS wants to move donated cadaver organs from where 
they are harvested and send them in an equitable fashion to the end-stage patient that has 
the greatest medical need (urgency). This could mean no more than keeping it in the 
same hospital, moving it across town or at the extreme moving it across the country (an 
extremely rare occurrence today, given perishability). Notwithstanding medical criteria 
affecting perishability, this has become a hot political issue in several states.
Each state has adopted a version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) 
that provides for human organs to be donated for transplantation as a “gift of life” given 
by a person to another person. In the United States, it is state law that guides organ 
donation. The UAGA and the state UAGA describe classes of persons who are legally 
capable of making such gifts and further, describes classes of persons who are legally 
capable of receiving such gifts. The current organ procurement system was essentially 
designed to honor state UAGA laws.
If the HHS Final Rule is implemented on October 1, 1999, as currently 
anticipated, many within the transplant community fear that smaller transplant centers 
will end up closing. This will occur because if organs are shipped around the country 
based on need, they are going to be moved towards the major metropolitan population 
centers. Again, that is the goal and the stated objective, notwithstanding the perishability 
issues. Fearing the closure of transplant centers within their state, a loss of jobs, and
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potential backlash in the numbers of donated organs, several states have already taken 
steps to preserve local transplantation programs.
Indeed, on April 30, 1998 Representative Robert Livingston of Louisiana, while 
attaching an amendment to a spending bill, remarked that Louisiana had enacted an 
amendment to its state UAGA law restricting the export of donor organs out of 
Louisiana. Further, Senator Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, testifying on September 10, 
1998 in opposition to the Final Rule stated “the current organ transplant program has 
been an extraordinary success.” The problem, he said, “is that there are simply not 
enough organs being donated locally.” He expressed support for those states (including 
New Jersey) that have passed legislation to restrict the exportation of organs outside the 
state in which they are donated.^ Subsequent to the release of the HHS proposal on April 
I"'*, 1998, at least a dozen states have passed similar restrictions on exporting organs 
donated within those same states.
In Louisiana, the first state to enact an amendment to its state UAGA, there was a 
large outcry when the Final Rule was first proposed. The State Legislature hurriedly 
passed the amendment to its UAGA. Interestingly, donations within Louisiana have 
picked up in the third and fourth quarters of 1998 since the adoption of this export 
restriction.'* It remains to be seen, how many states will take a state’s rights position in 
the face of a planned federalization of transplant policies. The states have a few^  factors 
working in their favor. First, organ procurement has always been a localized activity. 
Second, the reason for that has been and remains, the perishability factor of the donated 
organs. Harvested organs have a very short viable life span once removed from the host 
body. Third, donor families have been interviewed in Louisiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
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South Carolina, Wisconsin, and several other states that have passed laws mandating 
organs be offered first to their owti citizens. These families have made anecdotal 
statements relating to the fact that given a relatively common understanding of the 
perishability factor, that they would not have gone ahead with the donation if they 
believed that it might be wasted in the process of getting it to a remote location in another 
part of the United States.
Unfortunately, local, state, and donor family backlash could significantly impact 
donation as well as the future of the proposed regulation. This backlash has come about 
because of the highly publicized and negative nature of the debate amongst the various 
transplant industry participants -  physicians, hospital transplant centers, organ 
procurement organizations (OPO’s) — and as trumpeted in the national media ever since 
the public announcement of the HHS regulation. Overall, it is believed that patients are 
losing because the highly publicized nature of the debate has to be dampening the U.S. 
public’s willingness to donate organs. People do not trust the system and according to 
several opinion polls, that is a major reason why people who should donate do not. When 
newspaper headlines, wire service stories, and TV news programs feature one 
organization’s victory over another in organ allocation/donation, commonsense says it 
must be hurting donations. Like it or not, fiery claims and counter claims lead to 
perceptions of confusion and mistrust, perception is reality.
Given all the year-long negative debate and publicity, the federally sponsored 
Coalition on Donation has been finding it extremely difficult to wage a successful public 
education campaign about the importance of being an organ and tissue donor in light of 
the above-mentioned heated public debate. The Coalition has only a ten million-dollar
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budget appropriation in which to carry out its mission of promoting education regarding 
organ and tissue donation. Given all the negativity circulating around the proposed 
regulations, it should come as no surprise if the final numbers for 1998 and the totals for 
1999 fall below expectations. It appears that the negative policy debate is about power. 
Actually it is about a lot more than that. It is about the self-appointed mandate by HHS 
to improve equity in the organ allocation system (along with departmental/federal 
oversight), that has so stirred the debate among the medical, legal, hospital, insurance, 
and patients’ rights groups. Indeed, there is a great deal of money, power, prestige, and 
authority at stake for the first four above listed interest groups, while perhaps only life or 
a quality of life better lived, that is the driver for the patient’s issues.
Conclusions
Along the way toward the goal of deriving a set of final conclusions, the analysis 
to this point has illuminated several intermediate conclusions about how and why 
altruism has failed to address adequately the organ donors supply problem.
Chapter Two examined the (mostly empirical) costs vs. benefits viewpoint of the 
supply problem. Health economics in its larger sense deals with creating policy tools that 
can be used in establishing and making a case for the allocation of healthcare in a greater 
societal top-down view. In this context, society may often decide that healthcare 
resources and public financial support are as scarce as any other normal economic goods. 
Society may decide that at some point there are diminishing marginal benefits to 
employing resources and monetary funding towards the solution or cure of a particular 
health problem. That would certainly be the macroeconomic viewpoint. In a
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microeconomic sense, however, individuals often find that there are ways to obtain and 
utilize healthcare resources, such as organs for transplant, when society as a whole has 
made an empirical decision to allocate resources elsewhere. Closing Chapter Two was a 
listing and brief description of several practical suggestions for alleviating the donor 
shortage. Most of these had little or nothing to do with altruism, focusing instead on the 
concept of either market solutions to the problem or taking a more utilitarian (greatest 
good for the greatest number) approach. Most of these alternatives would be discarded 
while a few others were more thoroughly examined in a succeeding chapter.
The intermediate conclusion drawn from analysis in Chapter Three is that 
regardless of the large number o f ethical, moral, cultural, psychological, racial, and other 
practical issues facing individuals in society, we are not going to be able to address why 
society has tepidly allowed altruism to fail, until we begin to treat organ donation as a 
societal obligation, rather than an act o f volunteerism. Chapter Three examines all o f the 
above categories in some detail, in the determination of which factors impact on a 
population made up of individuals that combine to prevent any o f us as individuals from 
expressing, at the end of our lives, a desire to save or help others in desperate need. The 
many moral, ethical, psychological, behavioral, cultural and racial issues intertwine and 
become the ingredients o f an attitudinal “soup” that when consumed from childhood on 
forms the basis of our moral viewpoint. The intermediate conclusions o f Chapter Three 
drawn from the analysis, point to the desperate need to improve the donor rate in U.S. 
minorities. Both Blacks and Hispanics as groups are simultaneously on both ends of the 
donor-need continuum. First, a great deal of analysis has shown that those racial groups 
represent the greatest need factors when considering allocations to receive a transplant
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and yet. simultaneously, these groups historically are donating at less than five percent of 
their population. With more Blacks and Hispanics. proportionately, on the waiting list, 
the two group’s reluctance to donate causes an imbalance vis à vis saving lives. A second 
intermediate conclusion drawn from the analysis of the minorities, relates to possible 
solutions to this problem. A stepped-up continuous barrage of educational media needs 
to be more focused and re-targeted on the minority populations. These two groups 
represent the greatest number of patients waiting on lists, the greatest number of patients 
subsisting on dialysis, and the greatest number of patients who die either while waiting 
on a list or from ignorance or an original lack of knowledge about the transplant process. 
A third intermediate conclusion rising from the analysis in Chapter Three, points to the 
obligation of society in organ donation. Where there is an endemic cultural reluctance to 
become involved, society, here in the guise of a race or culture, truly has an obligation to 
step forward and energize the resources to communicate the benefits; while alleviating 
the fears and misunderstandings regarding donation and transplantation. Only then can 
the minority populations, which are particularly susceptible to certain end-stage organ 
failures, fully partake in the miracle that organ transplantation, via the “gift o f life,” 
represents.
Chapter Four revisits some of the incentive and/or proactive actions that have 
been discussed as potential solutions to the donor supply problem. Some o f the issues 
analyzed, such as future contracts for agreeing to become an organ donor upon death and 
non-financial programs such as required response and presumed consent, all offer some 
possibility or hope for alleviating the donor supply problem. As discussed in the 
analysis, some of the incentives are ethically questionable. Similarly, some of the
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proposed policy changes, also pose an ethical dilemma. In analyzing the various 
proposals for financial incentives, I looked at both pro and con arguments to determine 
where the greatest moral dilemmas might exist. I used the same analytical technique in 
discussing the non-financial policy recommendations. While financial incentives may 
seem viable, to implement any of them would require a change in existing law. For that 
matter, implementing any of the non-financial policy solutions would also require 
changing existing law.
O f the non-financial solutions, the concepts of required response and presumed 
consent offer the most potential for improving the raw numbers and thus the donor rate. 
Both ideas have been described in the transplantation literature for a number of years. 
However, the numerous references have differed as to scope, ethical viability and 
implementation strategies. Presumed consent is currently enacted as statute in Belgium, 
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, The Scandinavian Countries, and is part of a pilot 
program in the United Kingdom. Results from those countries over the last five years 
show dramatic donation increases versus a like period of time historically. 
Notwithstanding my arguments in Chapter Three which spoke to the dominance of 
libertarian moralities in the U.S., wherein stronger feelings toward individualism and 
property rights are pre-eminent, a communitarian effect appears to have much more 
influence in parts of Europe. This should not be surprising, as the intellectual 
underpinnings of communitarianism are, of course, socialism and earlier the more 
egalitarian versions of communism. Europe has long traditions of community priority 
over the individual -  personal property rights there are nowhere near as sacrosanct as in 
the U.S. Nevertheless, in Europe, presumed consent is working and their society is
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benefiting as evidenced by the increased numbers of both donations and transplants. The 
citizenry has banded to provide greater benefits for the society as a whole, and after 
several years of trial, do not appear to be ethically the worse.
Required response means that when citizens desire to obtain or renew certain 
public documents, they will be asked the question as to their choice when it comes to 
organ donation. Without penalty, they may choose either yes or no. Required response 
should be able to improve the participation rate of those who have predetermined what 
their wishes are for their body parts after they die. The act of requiring either an 
affirmative or negative response will over time increase the aggregate number of people 
who have indicated what their desires are. In Europe, statistically, this impact is positive.
A third non-financial action that could improve the donor rate is the concept of 
preferred status. This concept, which is gaining support within an ever-widening circle in 
the transplantation community, simply states that if you are willing to register as a donor, 
if at some point later in life you need a transplant, you would move to the head of the list. 
Preferred status is much less ethically challenging than presumed consent or even 
required response. The issue is, o f course, could it generate the numbers necessary to 
narrow the gap between donations and the required number of organs needed for 
transplant. Indeed, that is the key question, because otheiwdse, it successfully answers 
most of the ethical problems/questions relating to receiving a payment for volunteering to 
donate. Indicating a willingness to donate appears to be an appropriate quid pro quo for 
the slim possibility that at some point later in life being rewarded by moving to the head 
of the list to receive one’s own transplant. Projections have shown that the adoption of 
this proposal could generate adequate supplies of donor organs. Indeed, in the aggregate.
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the numbers o f identified “potential” cadaveric donors would likely increase sharply, 
ultimately benefiting many. Therefore, while the percentage of useable organs (per 
capita) donated would remain the same, at below 5 percent, the projected raw increases in 
“potential" donors would ratchet up the aggregate supply. Further, for the individual, the 
odds of end-stage organ failure requiring a transplant, are also slightly less than 5 percent. 
Ethically, that works well -  no segments o f the population would be asked to donate 
(after death) at a greater rate than the probability of ever needing an organ personally.
That further assumes that the minority populations that are more susceptible to certain 
organ-killing diseases receive, accept and act upon increased targeted educational, 
informational, and communications programs about their particular groups’ need factors. 
Once known and understood, it is hoped that the minorities will increase their 
proportional participation in their rational self interest.
On the other hand, the twin concepts of presumed consent and required response 
are probably not yet ethically suitable for the U. S. culture and citizenry. Belgium has 
found that for practical reasons, implementing required response first and getting the 
population used to the idea of “opting-in” or “opting-out” gets the potential donor over 
the psychological hurdle o f considering his’ or her’s own mortality, while at the same 
time effectively eliminating family veto as a barrier to the decedent’s altruistic final 
wishes.
Policy Recommendations
After all o f the discussion and analysis of all of the various factors affecting 
altruistic organ donation, it is my conclusion that none of the ethical or practical solutions
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can solve the supply dilemma on its own. However, I do not view the organ supply 
dilemma as a permanently unsolvable problem. Therefore, I make the following policy 
recommendations which, if enacted, can in various combinations of at least two or more, 
have a positive impact on the donor rate among all demographic segments of the 
population.
1. Educational programs that communicate the benefits of organ donation, while 
countering rumor and misconceptions, should be produced and widely 
disseminated via all types of media. This should be tactically implemented in a 
national campaign that specifically targets minorities by emphasizing their 
groups’ particular tissue-matching needs.
2. Implement educational campaigns that emphasize that organ donation is an 
obligation, rather than a supererogatory act of charity or altruism. This would be 
an innovative approach, and not without risks. To avoid potential conflicts with 
autonomy and self-determination embedded in U.S. culture as libertarian body 
parts-property rights precepts, pilot or test campaigns should be conceptualized 
and implemented first. I think this would yield significant improvements in the 
organ donor rate over time, yet I recognize that it also would require a paradigm 
shift.
3. Required request, which as discussed in the body of this thesis, mandates an 
answer to a request to become an organ donor. This would occur at points of civil 
contact where the population interacts with local government, e.g., DMV, courts, 
licensing bureaus of all types, voter registration etc. Additionally, I call for the 
establishment of a national database that records the answers and is accessible to
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Emergency Room personnel, hospitals, physicians and transplant coordinators -  
all o f whom have the ability to access at the time the decision to harvest needs to 
be made. Further, concurrent with the enactment of required request, rules should 
be in place that say that the database record of any individual’s consent or refusal 
to donate organs will govern, rather than the family’s desire at the time of death.
If a person cannot be found in the database, the person’s organs would not be 
harvested. This upholds the ethical concept of consent being explicit rather than 
presumed. Required request is likely to lead to a widespread changing of attitudes 
in the U.S. regarding organ donations. If such a change in attitudes occurs, (1) 
discussing organ donations with families of the deceased will be much easier and 
(2) it may become commonplace and expected that donation will occur when 
medically appropriate.
4. Preferred status is recommended for persons who volunteer to become organ 
donors while living. In exchange, they would be given a preferred status on 
waiting lists in obtaining an organ, should they come to need one. This is a form 
of an incentive-based solution to the supply problems discussed in this thesis, and 
although not originally conceived herein, this approach is substantially new to 
organ procurement and has not widespread attention.
Any or all o f the above will have to show in principle, that they can be set up and 
run without any appearance of ethical misconduct or abuse. When the total number of 
persons waiting on transplant lists is correlated with the number of people who are dying 
each year on those lists and further correlated with estimates of the number o f individuals 
who statistically/realistically do not get counted on either list, the time for establishing
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policy-based pilot programs for a combination or version of the above solutions is 
drawing near. In personal interviews with several transplant surgeons and clinicians at 
U.C.L. A. Medical Center, it is estimated that if the waiting list approaches to one 
hundred thousand people and/or the number of people dying while waiting on the lists 
reaches close to twenty to twenty-five thousand people, there will be a great awakening 
o f interest and a movement towards establishing full blown solution programs. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, any or all require changing the morally embedded 
UAGA and/or NOTA laws. My recommendations assume those changes as necessary 
preconditions.
As a final comment, the answer to the question asked by this thesis: Can the donor 
rate be improved in organ transplantation? -  is unequivocally, yes. That answer will 
come into its own reality when, as the central theme of Chapter Three states, society 
comes to the conclusion and realization that donating organs upon death is an obligation, 
and not merely volunteeristic Good Samaritanism. Therefore, our society, perhaps 
goaded by the spectre of unnecessarily lost lives, must shed some of our libertarian 
individualism and look to ourselves as a whole community being better able to provide 
solutions for those in need. The whole acting together can, in most cases, solve greater 
problems than individuals acting alone. It is synergistic, and when we as the society, 
reach that conclusion, we will have collectively arrived at a higher moral level of 
civilization.
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Endnotes
' Functionally, OPTN is a policy-making executive board of directors. HHS has 
oversight for OPTN. The OPO’s are the local/regional procurement/allocation agencies 
that actually do the work. UNOS (United Network of Organ Sharing) is the day-to-day 
operational contractor which sets criteria, manages data collection, and maintains waiting 
lists for all OPO's.
■ Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services 
Administration, 42 CFR, Part 121, Docket #: 98-HRSA-Ol.
 ^Health Resources and Services Administration, “HRS A Newsbrief’, Senate Sub- 
Committee Hears Testimony on Organ Transplantation Regulations. September 17, 1998.
National Kidney Foundation, “Transplant Chronicles,” vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1999.
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TABLE 1 
Number of Transplants Performed in 1997*
kidnQT-pancreas transplants 853
kidney alone transplants (3,712 were living donors) 11,470
pancreas alone transplants 208
Liver transplants 4,165
heart transplants 2,292
heart-lung transplants 62
lung transplants 928
intestine transplants 67
Total 20,045
'Based on UNOS Scientific Registry data as o f January 4, 1999. Double kidney, double lung, and heart-lung 
transplants are counted as one transpIanL NOTE: Data subject to change due to future data submission or 
correction.
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TABLE 2
Number of Donors Recovered, 1997*
.:.:c lumbeK:/
cadaveric 5,478
living 3,820
Total 9,298
•Based on UNOS Scientific Registry data as of January 4, 1999. Double kidney, double lung, and heart-lung 
transplants are counted as one transplant NOTE: Data subject to change due to future data submission or 
correction
144
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 3
On March 31,1999 the UNOS National patient waiting list for organ transplant 
includes the following:
■^pffbrTr‘^ plam t~^yi
kidney transplant 42,981 41,135
liver transplant 12,817 12,618
pancreas transplant 454 444
pancreas islet cell 
transplant 119 119
kidn^-pancreas
transplant 4,219 1.807
intestine transplant 114 114
heart transplant 4,219 4,203
heart-lung transplant 250 247
lung transplant 3.247 3,195
Totals Total Registrations: 66,071 *Total Patients: 62,068
NOTE: UNOS policies allow patients to be listed with more than one transplant center (multiple-listing), thus 
the number o f registrations is greater than the actual number of patients.
'Some patients are waiting for more than one organ, therefore the total number of patients is less than the sum 
of patients waiting for each organ.
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TABLE 4
Number of Patients Removed from the OPTN Waiting List Due to Death 
January 1, 1988 - December 31,1998
! # m # P mx tm # 1 # #
61 74 66 41 43 51 47 28 49 56 41
493 517 613 778 779 761 724 769 745 772 767
0 0 0 0 0 3 15 19 21 41 45
734 749 916 974 1047 1277 1365 1503 1802 1989 2295
0 0 0 0 14 59 70 84 91 121 93
196 282 317 435 495 560 655 797 956 1130 1319
m m # 16 38 50 137 218 251 286 340 386 409 486
5 21 19 35 32 2 8 3 3 11 9
1494 1659 1958 2351 2573 2883 3053 3414 3896 4313 4855
■D
CD
C/)
C/)
* Totals for each column will not equal overall total because some patients are listed more than once. Based on UNOS 
OPTN/Scientific Registry Data as o f February 24, 1999. Data subject to change due to future data submission or 
correction.
TABLE 5 
Number aod Type of UNOS Members
Type of UNOS Member Number
Transplant Centers 272
Consortium Members 3
Independent Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) 53
Independent Tissue Typing Laboratories (TTLs) 56
Voluntary Health Organizations 12
General Public Members 9
Medical/Scientific Organizations 29
Total 434
N*OTB: o r  the 272 Sraosplenl centert, 12 hive in-houac OPO's snd 103 h*ve tn-housc histocompalibilily Ubs.
Number and Type of Organ Transplant Programs
Currently, 272 medical institutions in the United States operate organ transplant 
programs. These transplant centers can be separated into organ specific programs 
that include the following:
Type of Program Number
Kidney Transplant Programs 252
Liver Transplant Programs 125
Pancreas Transplant Programs 125
Pancreas Islet Cell Transplant Programs 21
Intestine Transplant Programs 32
Heart Transplant Programs 153
Hcart-Lung Transplant Programs 94
Lung Transplant Programs 89
Total 891
NOTE: Data uibjcct to cfajngc due lo futuc d«u nibmiuion or correction.
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